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Several leading law scholars have attempted to explain why certain 
legal rules require a party to disclose information to the other contracting 
parties, often competing parties, in certain transactions.  Most notably, 
Dean Anthony Kronman, in his article, Mistake, Disclosure, 
Information, and the Law of Contracts, presents an economic theory 
explaining why unilateral mistake is allowed as a defense to preclude 
contract formation in some cases, but not others.1  As part of his 
argument, Dean Kronman discusses when a party has a duty to disclose 
information to the other contracting party when the other contracting 
party does not ostensibly possess that information.2  The obverse of the 
rule mandating disclosure is also discussed—when a party is privileged 
to remain silent even though the party possesses relevant information (a 
material fact) that the other contracting party would prefer to know.3  
Dean Kronman concludes that there is no duty to disclose relevant 
information that is a product of deliberate investment, but that one has a 
duty to disclose relevant information that is “casually acquired.”4 
Similarly, Professors Cooter and Ulen in their economic treatise, Law 
and Economics, put forth a theory to determine when the disclosure of a 
material fact is required from the knower to the knowee.5  They attempt 
to draw a distinction between those facts which they determine are 
productive (wealth producing or enhancing), which are not required to 
be disclosed between contracting parties, and those facts which are 
merely redistributive, which the knower is required to disclose to the 
knowee.6  Lastly, in a fascinating book addressing the legal issues and 
rights that flow from, and are related to, the phenomenon of “secrecy,” 
 1. Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of 
Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1–2 (1978). 
 2. For a fuller explanation of Dean Kronman’s thesis, see infra notes 19–23 and 
accompanying text. 
 3. For ease of discussion, the party possessing knowledge of the material fact will 
hereafter be referred to as the knower and the party to whom the fact will either be 
disclosed or not, depending upon the rule and the allocation of duty, will hereafter be 
referred to as the knowee. 
 4. Kronman, supra note 1, at 13–14.  For further discussion, see infra notes 19–
28 and accompanying text. 
 5. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 281–86 (4th ed. 
2004). 
 6. For a fuller explanation of Cooter and Ulen’s thesis, see infra notes 31, 33–35, 
100 and accompanying text. 
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buyer.   Caveat emptor, then, is a huge exception to any doctrine 
 
Professor Scheppele theorizes that one party to a contract is privileged to 
keep a secret premised on the relative cost of each party’s access to the 
material fact or relevant information.7  Briefly, Professor Scheppele’s 
disclosure theory mandates disclosure of secret information if the 
marginal cost of that information is much less for one party to the 
contract than for the other party to the contract.8 
Although most of these theories have been articulated to explain why 
disclosure is or is not required in certain contracting situations having to 
do with the sale of personalty, it is clear that these theories, if correct, 
must also apply to contracting situations involving the sale of realty.  
That is, when the vendor and vendee enter into the contract for the 
purchase and sale of real property, they execute a contract that allocates 
their respective rights and liabilities.  A critical issue at the time of 
contract formation has to do with what, if any, facts the vendor-seller 
(knower) must disclose to the vendee-buyer (knowee) regarding the 
condition of the premises being sold.  Enter the doctrine of caveat 
emptor, which at common law, in its purest form, provides a safe harbor 
to the vendor-seller not to disclose any information to the vendee-
9
 7. KIM LANE SCHEPPELE EGAL ECRETS  QUALITY AND FFICIENCY IN THE 
COMMON LAW 109–26 (1988). 
 8. Id.  In contrast, Scheppele rejects an efficiency explanation and reinterprets the 
line of cases similar to Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817), in terms of an 
equal access principle, according to which disclosure is mandatory if the marginal cost of 
information is much less for one party to the contract than for the other party.  See also 
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 260 n.8 (1st ed. 1988); 
SCHEPPELE, supra note 7, at 112–24.  In Laidlaw, the British blockaded the port of New 
Orleans during the War of 1812, which caused the price of exported goods—in this case, 
tobacco—to drop.  Organ, a purchaser of tobacco, received information before the 
market that the war had ended by treaty and purchased tobacco at the depressed blockade 
price.  When the treaty was made public, the price of tobacco soared.  Laidlaw, 15 U.S. 
(2 Wheat.) at 183–84.  This is the prototypical case involving unilateral mistake; Organ 
knew about the treaty but the seller, Laidlaw, did not, and the seller sought to set the 
contract aside based on the unilateral mistake in formation.  Ultimately the Supreme 
Court affirmed the contract.  Id. at 195.  It is this case that is discussed by Dean Kronman, 
Professors Cooter and Ulen, and Professor Scheppele to test their various justif
, L S : E E
ications 
r
., UNDERSTANDING MODERN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 
for rules equiring the disclosure of information for contracting parties. 
 9. Although discussed in more detail in Part II, simply put, the common law 
doctrine of caveat emptor, or “let the buyer beware,” means that in the absence of fraud, 
misrepresentation, or active concealment, the seller is under no duty to disclose any 
defects—except those latent defects known to create an unreasonable risk of harm to 
persons on the premises—in the subject premises to the putative buyer, and the buyer has 
a duty to discover such defects upon a reasonable examination of the property.  See 
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ic theories on the doctrine of caveat emptor is, 
ho
 theories to the doctrine may 
ha
requiring the disclosure of information from the knower to the knowee. 
This Article examines the economic theories that 
quiring the disclosure of information between contracting parties in 
light of the development and evolution of the doctrine of caveat emptor.  
If correct, these theories predicting when information must be disclosed 
must account for the common law usurpation of disclosure requirements 
in the purchase and sale of realty.  In other words, if the economic 
analysis is correct, these theories must explain why no disclosure of 
information is required with respect to the sale of realty at common law.  
The alternative explanation is that the caveat emptor doctrine should not 
be applied with respect to the sale of realty—that its use has been 
erroneous for centuries.  Hence if the theories are accurate, some disclosure is 
or should be required with respect to the sale of realty.  Conversely, if 
the economic theory mandates disclosure of certain information even 
with respect to the sale of realty, perhaps the common law doctrine of 
caveat emptor is ill-suited to address issues that arise from modern-day 
real estate transactions. 
Mapping these econom
wever, not without problems.  The doctrine has not remained static 
over time.  Indeed, although it is fair to say that the common law 
doctrine is fairly easy to articulate and apply, the doctrine itself, as 
applied by the courts, has become riddled with exceptions and has been 
made null and void by certain legislative enactments.  Thus, a case can 
be made that the rationale for the use of caveat emptor with respect to 
the sale of realty may have been appropriate at the time the doctrine was 
developed.  However, changes in the nature of the property being sold 
may have resulted, over time, in the need for information to be disclosed 
consistent with the theories discussed above.  This requirement of 
disclosure of information from seller to buyer in the residential real 
estate transaction, expressed as exceptions to the caveat emptor doctrine, 
may demonstrate the efficacy of the economic theories put forth to 
explain disclosure rules.  However, in one final twist, these theories must 
also explain why the doctrine of caveat emptor, in a modified form that I 
characterize as “caveat emptor light,” is now emerging as a result of 
court opinions and legislative enactments. 
In other words, applying these economic
ve power to explicate what is currently a puzzle: Why has the common 
law doctrine of caveat emptor been obliterated through exceptions 
causing yet another version of caveat emptor—caveat emptor light—to 
emerge as a result?  Factor in the changing nature of the real estate being 
 
§ 2.06(A) (2d ed. 2007). 
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 correctly establishes the correct duty for disclosure of 
 
sold (agrarian land to complex residential dwellings) and the stage is set 
for a historical analysis of a doctrine that has transformed itself to adapt 
to current transactional norms.  Consequently, following a brief primer 
on the three economic theories which attempt to explain when disclosure 
is or should be required among contracting parties and which would tend 
to eliminate or disp
nsaction, this Article begins with a historical exegesis of the doctrine 
of caveat emptor.10 
As a result, this Article examines the evolution of the caveat emptor 
doctrine from its common law origins to its current status in American 
law.  In so doing, this historical analysis tests several economic theories 
and attempts to analyze the same in light of the doctrine’s evolution.  By 
using economic theory regarding when material facts should be 
disclosed, I hope to demonstrate that the original formulation of caveat 
emptor at common law was the correct and efficient rule for the parties 
at that time.  Conversely, I demonstrate that the exceptions which have 
become associated with the caveat emptor rule—which have riddled the 
rule—represent attempts by the courts to align disclosure requirement
 parties to a transaction which bears little resemblance to the vendor-
vendee transaction that originated at common law in agrarian England. 
What I hope to demonstrate is that caveat emptor in its pristine 
common law form is deemed inapposite for the modern residential real 
estate transaction, yet perfectly suited for the real estate transactions that 
took place as the doctrine was originally developed and applied.  It is the 
change in the very nature of the real estate transaction that caused the 
doctrine of caveat emptor to become inapposite for real estate 
transactions.  However, the mandatory disclosure of all information from 
seller, or knower, to buyer, or knowee, as mandated by courts and laws 
focusing on the status of the parties, is also incongruent and inapposite 
with the economic theories requiring the disclosure of information.  This 
is so because these new laws require inefficient disclosure of 
information by mandating the disclosure of all information, including 
that which is the product of deliberate investment and, relatedly, 
information that is equally available to both parties.  As a result, and 
efficiently, caveat emptor light is emerging, which I will document is 
consistent with the economic theories requiring disclosure of 
information and
 10. See infra note 43 and accompanying text. 







formation from the knower, or vendor-seller, to the knowee, or 
vendee-buyer. 
The evolution of caveat emptor also serves to validate Professor 
Rose’s theory in her article, Crystals and Mud in Property Law,11 which 
is addressed in the fourth and final part of this Article.12  Professor Rose, 
analyzing the evolution of common law through judicial opinions, 
hypothesizes that, broadly speaking, judicial opinions often have the 
effect of taking what she terms a “crystal” rule—a rule that is easy to 
interpret and apply because its contours are certain, like caveat emptor—
and ultimately transforming it into a “mud” rule—the antithesis of a 
crystal rule or a rule that is difficult to interpret and apply because of the 
rule’s complexity or the fact-related nature of the rule which requires 
precise application of certain facts to a rule to produce a predictable 
outcome.13  In effect, I argue that the courts have done to the caveat 
emptor rule exactly what Professor Rose hypothesized.  The courts have 
taken a simple and easy-to-apply rule and have muddied it to the extent 
that treatises and articles are now written regarding its applicability.14  
The evolution of caveat emptor light represents an attempt to transform 
what is now a mud rule into a new crystal rule.  This process by which 
the crystal rule becomes the mud rule and is in the throes of becoming 
crystal again is caused by courts’ attempts to align the parties’ duties
sclose information in the residential real estate transaction consistent 
with their acquisition of information about the residences being sold. 
This Article is divided into four parts.  Part I briefly summarizes the 
existing literature which provides an economic justification determining 
when material facts must be disclosed to an opposing party as part of the 
contracting process.  Part II spends considerably more time analyzing 
the common law caveat emptor doctrine and its evolution to its current 
status as a doctrine heavily riddled with exceptions and on the verge of 
obsolescence.  It pays particular attention to the evolution of the doctrine 
of caveat emptor by focusing on those exceptions to the doctrine to 
demonstrate that the common law doctrine of caveat emptor is premised 
on the parties having equal bargaining power and, as theorized by 
Professor Scheppele,15 is based on access to equal information which 
can be thwarted by the delivery of erroneous information or the 
 11. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 
580–83 (1988). 
 12. The impetus for this Article, in part, is Professor Rose’s use of the caveat 
emptor doctrine—actually its erosion in modern law—as one of three examples of 
crystal rules evolving into mud rules.  See infra notes 116–33 and accompanying text. 
 13. See Rose, supra note 11, at 580–83. 
 14. See infra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 15. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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t II to 
ex
so complex and full of potential defects that can 
af
s into the opposite of caveat 
em
at emptor is accomplished by a shift in the 
default rules that has heretofore gone unnoticed, but represents an 
portant aspect of the developm
complexity of the dwelling conveyed.  It then contrasts the economic 
theories in Part I with the caveat emptor doctrine examined in Par
pose the conflict between the economic theories that explain when 
information must be disclosed and the evolution of the caveat emptor 
doctrine. 
Part III continues the focus on caveat emptor light and demonstrates 
that courts and legislatures are attempting to align the disclosure rules 
regarding real property so that they are consistent with the economic 
theories regarding optimal disclosure rules postulated by Dean Kronman 
and Professors Cooter and Ulen.  The problem, however, is the ad hoc 
nature of the determinations given the complexity of the property being 
transferred and the potential defects that can also arise.  The modern 
residential dwelling is 
fect or impede value that ex post determinations regarding when 
disclosures must be made become factually driven rather than driven by 
any consistent theory. 
Furthermore, the key to the judicial treatment of caveat emptor is the 
fact that the determination of breach of the duty of requisite disclosure is 
made with judicial hindsight; it is only later—after the sale—that one 
can determine whether the disclosure is or should have been required.  
Thus, the duty to disclose quickly evolve
ptor—the requirement that a seller make mandatory disclosures of 
every fact to the buyer and the safe harbor provisions of statutes 
detailing which facts must be disclosed.16 
Thus, the concluding portion of Part III also traces the reemergence of 
caveat emptor, as provided by statutes which allow sellers to once again 
make no representation or warranty with respect to the quality of the 
premises sold, thereby allowing the seller to sell the property as is.  This 
new imposition of cave
im ent of the new rules of caveat emptor, 
or caveat emptor light.17 
 
 16. By delineating which disclosures must be made from seller to buyer, these 
statutes make residential real estate transactions homogenous—assume all properties are 
m  
the seller 
si ilarly situated and that all buyers and sellers possess and request the same 
information—and remove the probity of nondisclosure of facts or conditions not covered 
by the statutes from any hindsight determination.  For further discussion, see infra notes 
85–92 and accompanying text. 
 17. The important shift in the default rule is that at common law, the seller could 
remain silent and take advantage of the doctrine of caveat emptor as long as 




The fourth and concluding part of the Article returns briefly to the 
doctrine of caveat emptor in order to reconcile the apparent conflict 
between the economic theories and the doctrine of caveat emptor.  I 
argue that this apparent conflict disappears when the caveat emptor cases 
are viewed through a historical prism in which the sale of real property 
is viewed as evolving from a transaction in which certain information is 
never produced or acquired because that information is easily accessible 
to both parties, to its current “modern” iteration in which deliberate and 
casually acquired information is routinely produced.  To support my thesis, 
and as noted above, I demonstrate that caveat emptor light has emerged 
and will continue to develop and solidify in a process eloquently 
described by Professor Rose.18 
When coupled with Professor Rose’s analysis, the economic theories 
on disclosure of information serve as powerful explanatory theories to 
make pellucid why the caveat emptor doctrine in its pristine common 
law formulation is ill-suited for modern transactions and, as a result, has 
become riven with exceptions giving rise to caveat emptor light.  Lastly, 
I add one observation to Professor Rose’s theory that may explain why 
crystal rules become mud rules in some areas, but not others.  Professor 
Rose’s theory more likely applies to areas in which the subject area of 
the law is also changing or evolving.  As technological advances alter, 
modify, or redefine that which is the subject or object of the law, the law 
must also adapt to internalize the changes that have created new forms of 
property subject to old or inapposite rules. 
I.  THE ECONOMIC THEORIES REGARDING DISCLOSURE                                       
OF INFORMATION 
By examining cases involving unilateral mistake and, more particularly, 
when a unilaterally mistaken promisor is excused from performing per 
the contract when her error is known or should be known to the other 
party, Dean Kronman presents a theory of when information possessed 
by one contracting party—the knower—must be disclosed to the other 
contracting party—the knowee—and, conversely, when nondisclosure is 
privileged in the same setting.  Dean Kronman first establishes that the 
possession of information should be treated by the state as a property 
right in order to allow individuals to benefit from the possession of 
secret or semi-secret information. 
remained silent.  See infra notes 92, 95–100, 112 and accompanying text.  Under the 
modern formulation of caveat emptor, the seller can remain silent but in so doing must 
alert the buyer that the silence has legal consequences—the purchaser buying the 
property as is—that the buyer must internalize as part of the sale. 
 18. See Rose, supra note 11. 
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   One effective way of insuring that an individual will benefit from the 
possession of information (or anything else for that matter) is to assign him a 
property right in the information itself—a right or entitlement to invoke the 
coercive machinery of the state in order to exclude others from its use and 
enjoyment.  The benefits of possession become secure only when the state 
transforms the possessor of information into an owner by investing him with a 
legally enforceable property right of some sort or other.  The assignment of 
property rights in information is a familiar feature of our legal system.  The 
legal protection accorded patented inventions and certain trade secrets are two 
obvious examples.19 
Dean Kronman then extends this standard economic theory to 
contracting parties and explains that a property right in information is 
similarly created when a party possessing material or relevant information is 
permitted to enter and enforce contracts without disclosing the information 
to the other party.  Concomitantly, a duty to disclose information is the 
equivalent of a requirement that the information be “publicly shared” 
and would destroy the legal protection afforded to private property.20  
From this basic theory of property rights, Kronman draws a distinction 
between information that must be disclosed—property in the public 
domain and which cannot be held privately—and information that need 
not be disclosed to the other contracting party.21  The latter is deemed 
and treated as private property that is protected by society through 
enforcement of the contract notwithstanding the nondisclosure and is 
premised on an economic justification.  The economic justification that 
undergirds the theory is that society is better off when investments are 
encouraged or made in the creation or production of information that 
will subsequently affect investments or investment decisions.  More 
importantly, the investment that creates the production of information 
will be made at a socially desirable level only if that information is 
protected by “a legal privilege of nondisclosure [that] is in effect a 
property right . . . .”22 
 19. Kronman, supra note 1, at 14 (footnotes omitted). 
 20. Imposing a duty to disclose upon the knowledgeable party deprives him of  
a private advantage which the information would otherwise afford.  A duty to 
disclose is tantamount to a requirement that the benefit of the information be 
publicly shared and is thus antithetical to the notion of a property right 
which—whatever else it may entail—always requires the legal protection of 
private appropriation. 
Id. at 15 (footnote omitted). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 2. 




Hence, it is only when investments are made in the acquisition or 
production of information that the investor should be awarded the protection 
of a property right.  Dean Kronman characterizes this information as 
deliberately acquired information and contrasts its antimony, casually 
acquired information. 
    In some cases, the individuals who supply information have obtained it by a 
deliberate search; in other cases, their information has been acquired casually. . . . 
    As it is used here, the term “deliberately acquired information” means 
information whose acquisition entails costs which would not have been incurred 
but for the likelihood, however great, that the information in question would 
actually be produced.  These costs may include, of course, not only direct search 
costs (the cost of examining the corporation’s annual statement) but the costs of 
developing an initial expertise as well (for example, the cost of attending 
business school).  If the costs incurred in acquiring the information . . . would have 
been incurred in any case—that is, whether or not the information was 
forthcoming—the information may be said to have been casually acquired.  The 
distinction between deliberately and casually acquired information is a 
shorthand way of expressing this economic difference.  Although in reality it may 
be difficult to determine whether any particular item of information has been 
acquired in one way or the other, the distinction between these two types of 
information has—as I hope to show—considerable analytical usefulness.23 
Relating this theory to the purchase and sale of real property and the 
doctrine of caveat emptor, Dean Kronman asserts that, except in one 
context involving patent defects, the information possessed by the 
typical homeowner and vendor is casually acquired information—
information that would have been acquired in any event—which should 
lead to its disclosure.24  With respect to patent or obvious defects, Dean 
Kronman agrees with the prevailing and almost universally held view 
that such defects need not be disclosed.  He aligns this nondisclosure 
rule with his theory by noting that since the information not disclosed is 
patent, its disclosure is unnecessary since the party on whom the 
nondisclosure burden would be placed, the vendor-seller, assumes that 
    From a social point of view, it is desirable that information which reveals a 
change in circumstances affecting the relative value of commodities [for 
example] reach the market as quickly as possible (or put differently, that the 
time between the change itself and its comprehension and assessment be 
minimized).  If a farmer who would have planted tobacco had he known of the 
change plants peanuts instead, he will have to choose between either uprooting 
one crop and substituting another (which may be prohibitively expensive and 
will in any case be costly), or devoting his land to a nonoptimal use.  In either 
case, both the individual farmer and society as a whole will be worse off than 
if he had planted tobacco to begin with.  The sooner information of the change 
[in the market] reaches the farmer, the less likely it is that social resources will 
be wasted. 
Id. at 12 (footnote omitted). 
 23. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 24. Id. at 22–25. 
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the other party, the vendee-buyer, is already in possession of that 
information given its obviousness.  As a result, he states that a legal rule 
requiring communication of this sort would needlessly increase transaction 
costs, with no corresponding benefit, because knowledge of a patent 
defect is “equally available to the parties.”25 
Thus, Dean Kronman agrees with the emerging trend to require the 
disclosure of information regarding the status of the property being sold 
and the concomitant large-scale erosion of the doctrine of caveat emptor 
because the information being disclosed is casually acquired and the 
disclosing seller is the “cheapest cost avoider” given the seller’s obvious 
access to information concerning the quality of the dwelling and any 
potential defects.26  In other words, the rule should protect nondisclosure 
only if the “seller has made a deliberate investment in acquiring his 
knowledge which he would not have made had he known he would be 
required to disclose to purchasers of the property any defects he 
discovered.”27  Discovering termites, for example, would not be the type 
of deliberately acquired information that the homeowner would be 
privileged to withhold from—not to disclose to—the vendee-purchaser. 
To the contrary, this information would have to be disclosed because 
it is either casually acquired by the homeowner-seller during the course 
of living in the residence or, even if it is the product of a deliberate 
investment, such as hiring a termite inspector to search for latent termite 
infestation, it is an investment that the homeowner-seller would make in 
any event to protect his investment in the property.  In other words, even 
if it were the product of a deliberate investment, a disclosure requirement 
would not likely reduce the production of such information in the future.  
Hence, there is no societal incentive to privilege that information—
protect it as property—when the information regarding the existence of 
termites is initially possessed solely by the homeowner-seller. 
To sum up, Dean Kronman’s theory, as it pertains to the sale of real 
property, states that the information possessed by typical homeowners 
selling their house is casually acquired information or, if the product of 
investment, is information that would have been acquired in any event 
which should lead to its disclosure.  The only exception relates to patent 
or obvious defects in the property being sold. 
 25. Id. at 23. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 25. 




Assuming arguendo that Dean Kronman is correct, it does not explain 
why the common law rule was and is to the contrary.  In other words, the 
doctrine of caveat emptor, which is discussed in detail below,28 
establishes the exact opposite rule—that the seller has no duty to 
disclose any information to the buyer, and it is the buyers of the realty 
who must conduct their own inspection and assume the risk of loss 
caused by any latent defects if they decide to purchase.29 
Of course, as noted below, the modern doctrine of caveat emptor is 
riddled with exceptions and is on the decline.30  Hence, one could make 
the argument that the doctrine in its original formulation was improperly 
applied to the sale of real property and should no longer be applied to the 
sale of realty.  Although this flies in the face of historical reality, one can 
defend the erosion of the doctrine of caveat emptor and, relatedly, the 
lack of duty imposed on the seller to disclose patent defects, as positive 
developments from an efficiency or economic standpoint, because when 
the seller is forced to disclose information that is casually acquired, the 
disclosing seller is the cheapest cost avoider.  In addition, and perhaps 
just as importantly, such a disclosure requirement with respect to the 
condition of the realty being sold would not likely reduce the production 
of such information in the future.  
As noted above, there are two additional theories which attempt to 
determine and explain when disclosure is or should be required by and 
between contracting parties.  Professor Scheppele’s theory, expressed in 
her book and discussed in an earlier edition of Cooter and Ulen’s 
treatise, is premised on an equal access principle.31  As I understand it, 
Professor Scheppele believes that disclosure should be mandatory if the 
production costs or the marginal cost of information is much less for one 
party to the contract than it is for the other party.  Thus, Professor 
Scheppele’s theory puts the burden for the acquisition and disclosure of 
information on the person with the most effective or efficient access to 
the information and reduces or eliminates costs that could inhibit or 
increase the cost of the transaction thereby precluding or impeding same. 
Pursuant to this theory, akin to Dean Kronman’s theory, the selling 
homeowner and occupier of the house being sold has easier and greater 
access to the condition of the premises sold than the vendee-buyer of the 
 28. See infra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. 
 29. Compare, however, latent defects that are dangerous, that is they represent a 
serious risk of harm to the purchaser or visitors to the property and are known to the 
seller.  These latent defects that are dangerous and known to the seller must be disclosed 
to the buyer.  This represents the only exception in the common law doctrine of caveat 
emptor.  See JOHNSON, supra note 9, § 2.06(B)(1). 
 30. See infra notes 63–83 and accompanying text. 
 31. SCHEPPELE, supra note 7, at 109–26; COOTER & ULEN, supra note 8, at 260 n.8. 
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house.  Consequently, the vendor-seller would have the duty to disclose 
material information to the vendee-buyer.  The only exception, again, 
would be with respect to patent defects.  Since those defects are by 
definition obvious and apparent to both parties, the seller no longer has 
better or easier access to the information regarding this particular defect 
and, correspondingly, no duty to disclose it.  As addressed below, applying 
this theory to the sale of real estate results in the large-scale eradication 
of the doctrine of caveat emptor and raises new questions regarding its 
efficacy with respect to the sale of real property.32 
The third and last theory to address the efficient production of 
information from one contracting party, the knower, to the other, the 
knowee, is that elaborated by Professors Cooter and Ulen in their 
exceptional treatise, Law and Economics.33  Professors Cooter and Ulen 
base their theory on the distinction between so-called productive versus 
redistributive information.  Simply put, productive facts are those facts 
that are used to increase wealth.34  On the other hand, redistributive facts 
are those facts that simply reallocate wealth between the contracting 
parties.  It is information that creates a bargaining advantage that can be 
used to redistribute wealth in favor of the knowledgeable party, the 
knower, but does not lead to creation of new wealth, or does not grow 
the pie. 
Professors Cooter and Ulen recognize that their distinction between 
productive and nonproductive facts differs from Dean Kronman’s 
distinction between deliberately and casually acquired information, but 
assert that they are related tests in that both distinctions seek to validate 
those facts and the search for information or production of facts that is 
efficient and, therefore, encourages and rewards that efficient behavior.35 
Professors Cooter and Ulen also concede that the distinction between 
productive and redistributive facts is not often clear and that most new 
facts acquired by the knower are mixed in that they both produce new 
wealth and redistribute existing wealth.  Hence, the authors conclude 
that most new facts acquired by the knower are mixed, and that in their 
analysis of contracts that are enforced versus those that are set aside for 
 32. See infra notes 36–42 and accompanying text.  Access to information is a very 
broad term because the seller will always know more than the buyer even if the buyer 
has exercised the right to inspect the property and has done so thoroughly. 
 33. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 5, at 281–86. 
 34. Id. at 281. 
 35. Id. at 283 n.37. 




nondisclosure of information, the contracts that are enforced are those 
where the knower has knowledge of mixed facts—productive and 
redistributive—and those that are set aside are those where the knower 
has knowledge of purely redistributive facts and fails to disclose them to 
the knowee.  From these scenarios, they draw the conclusion that 
knowledge and the creation of private rights in productive facts should 
be encouraged, and gains based on private knowledge of purely 
redistributive facts should be discouraged through the use of contractual 
remedies. 
Without going into too much detail, it should be obvious that Dean 
Kronman’s theory of deliberate versus casually acquired facts and 
Professors Cooter and Ulen’s theory of productive versus redistributive 
facts can be combined to produce one theory in which there are four 
cells.  The cell that would be the most supportive of nondisclosure on the 
part of the knower would be that cell that consists of deliberately 
acquired information that is productive.  Its antimony is casually 
acquired redistributive facts in which disclosure is required under both 
theories.  In these two bipolar extremes, one would expect to see the 
cases decided consistently—no disclosure required for deliberately 
acquired productive facts and disclosure required for casually acquired 
redistributive facts known to the knower.  If these theories are accurate 
or at all explanatory, one would expect to see mixed outcomes in cases 
in which the two theories point in different directions—deliberately 
acquired facts that are redistributive or casually acquired facts that are 
wealth-enhancing or wealth-producing.36 
 36. Professor Scheppele’s theory, which is premised on access and is discussed 
supra at note 31 and accompanying text, can also be combined here to strengthen the two 
bipolar cells that lead to divergent outcomes in all cases.  By that I mean, if the 
deliberately acquired and productive fact is accessible to both parties and discovered by 
one, this fact should not have to be disclosed by the knower.  Conversely, if the casually 
acquired, distributive fact is accessible to only one party—or accessible to the knowee at 
a much greater cost—then the fact should be disclosed. 
At this time I want to disaggregate Professor Scheppele’s theory from the theories of 
Dean Kronman and Professors Cooter and Ulen because I believe her theory may, in 
many cases, be too subjective and difficult to apply for the trier of fact.  Determining 
access to facts or knowledge and the costs of that access or knowledge will require some 
inquiry into the state of knowledge or mind of both parties before the fact is discovered.  
That inquiry differs from the hindsight, or later, determination regarding whether a fact 
is deliberately acquired, which focuses on the objective steps the knower took to gain 
control or knowledge of the pertinent fact, or whether a fact is productive or merely 
redistributive, which simply requires a calculation of wealth affects after the fact is 
known by one or both parties.  However, Professor Scheppele’s theory is pertinent to the 
residential real estate market given its focus on access that is clearly divergent and 
dispositive in residential real estate transactions where the seller, or knower, has lived in 
the property being sold and the buyer, or knowee, does not and will not have access until 
after the transaction is concluded. 
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Mapping these theories onto the sale of residential real estate, one 
initially faces a hurdle: How did the doctrine of caveat emptor—“let the 
buyer beware”—with its concomitant lack of duty of disclosure, emerge 
in the sale of residential real property?  A quick review of the three 
theories discussed and their applicability to the residential real estate 
transaction almost immediately leads to the contrary conclusion that the 
seller of residential real estate—the knower in the hypotheticals above—
should have a duty to disclose information known to the buyer—the 
knowee above—given any of the three theories posited to explain and 
require the disclosure of information.  That, of course, is the antithesis of 
the caveat emptor rule, which, in its purest form, requires that the seller 
say nothing to the buyer with respect to the condition of the premises 
sold.37 
Take, for example, the homeowner who has owned her home for a 
period of ten years and who during that time has incurred costs for 
plumbing, electric, and heating repairs, as well as paid a professional 
exterminator to rid the house of termites, the latter of which were 
discovered in the second year of occupancy.  As a result of this owner’s 
occupancy of the premises, she is aware that when it rains more than 
four inches in a twenty-four hour period, the basement floods.  Similarly, 
the owner-seller is aware that the termite infestation will more than 
likely reoccur unless the home is treated annually.  Finally, although this 
will become important later, the homeowner is selling the house because 
her spouse was murdered in the house by an intruder, and she no longer 
views the house as a home.38 
 37. Indeed, in certain situations silence is a safe harbor that the seller should be 
encouraged to take advantage of lest the seller be accused of misrepresenting facts by 
omission: 
The doctrine of caveat emptor does not protect the seller of a pre-owned home 
from tort liability for affirmative misrepresentation or concealment of defects 
in the property.  Though some “puffing” and sales talk is permissible, sellers 
must act reasonably in order to avoid a future misrepresentation claim.  Sellers 
must disclose any known information that might affect the buyer’s decision to 
purchase, and they are held just as liable for concealing the truth as they are for 
telling outright lies. 
JOHNSON, supra note 9, § 2.06(B)(2) (footnote omitted). 
 38. I posit this last fact situation to plumb the issues that have arisen recently 
regarding whether there is a duty on the part of the seller to disclose so-called 
reputational or psychic harms associated with the dwelling to the putative buyer.  For 
further discussion, see infra note 47 and text accompanying notes 109–10. 




At common law, as long as these conditions were not dangerous and 
latent, and there was no active concealment of any of these conditions or 
misrepresentations about them if asked directly, the seller had no duty to 
disclose these conditions even though the conditions were material and 
relevant to the price of the property sold.  If the buyer did not discover 
these conditions during his inspection, and if there were no warranties or 
guarantees with respect to the sale—the property is sold as is—the buyer 
purchased the property with its defects and the buyer was forced to 
accept said property in that condition with no recourse—rescission or 
damages—against the nondisclosing seller. 
And yet according to the three economic theories regarding disclosure 
of information, the selling homeowner presents perhaps the clearest case 
that the homeowner should disclose all of the information described 
above to the buyer before the sale is consummated to accomplish the 
efficient and correct outcome.  Taking first the most prominent theory, 
that put forth by Dean Kronman,39 it would appear obvious that 
information acquired by the homeowner in the context of owning one’s 
home is or will be defined as information that is casually acquired as 
opposed to information that is the product of an investment and 
deliberately acquired.40 
Without going into great, and I believe unnecessary, detail, I think it is 
beyond doubt that a homeowner’s acquisition of the information described 
above regarding the quality of the house in question is information that 
is casually acquired, like that information acquired by the businessperson 
riding the bus overhearing a conversation between two other riders that 
provides the businessperson with valuable information regarding an 
initial public offering (IPO).41  The principal purpose for purchasing the 
house is to reside in the house—to occupy the dwelling.  The information 
regarding the quality of the house is information that is ancillary to the 
occupation of the house.  In other words, the costs of producing that 
information would have been incurred as a byproduct of living in the 
home, and the costs to produce that information would have been 
incurred whether the information in question would have actually been 
 39. See supra notes 19–28 and accompanying text. 
 40. In some cases, the individuals who supply information have obtained it by  
a deliberate search; in other cases, their information has been acquired 
casually.  A securities analyst, for example, acquires information about a 
particular corporation in a deliberate fashion—by carefully studying evidence 
of its economic performance.  By contrast, a businessman who acquires a 
valuable piece of information when he accidentally overhears a conversation 
on a bus acquires the information casually. 
Kronman, supra note 1, at 13 (footnotes omitted).  For a definition of deliberately acquired 
information, see supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 41. See Kronman, supra note 1, at 13. 
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produced.42  The production of this information was a byproduct of the 
costs of living in the home and not the result of any deliberate search for 
any information or expenditure of special costs to obtain information 
that would not otherwise be produced.  I can belabor the point, but it 
appears to be an obvious one.  The typical information possessed by a 
homeowner acquired as a byproduct of the occupation and use of a 
dwelling would appear to be the prototypical example of casually 
acquired information.  Therefore, that information is clearly the type of 
information that, per Dean Kronman’s theory, must be disclosed, if 
relevant to the other contracting party—the vendee-knowee purchasing 
the property. 
Turning to the two other theories discussed above, it should also be 
obvious that the homeowner possesses information that is clearly 
redistributive as opposed to information that will produce new wealth.  
The fact that the basement floods periodically, that the home has been 
infested by termites, and that a murder took place in the home will not in 
any circumstances create any new wealth for either the seller or the 
buyer in this situation.  Quite the contrary, the possession of this information 
by one party, to the exclusion of the other party, could and should lead to 
the redistribution of the wealth between the parties as reflected in the 
sales price.  The buyer may pay more than warranted for the house 
without knowledge of the relevant information.  Conversely, if the buyer 
is aware of the property’s defects, the price paid for the property may be 
reduced, leaving more wealth in the hands of the buyer and providing 
less to the seller. 
Examining the last theory discussed above, access to information put 
forward by Professor Scheppele, this is yet another example where the 
answer is obvious: the seller who has occupied the house for several 
years has much better access to the information than the buyer, even one 
who has hired an inspector to undertake an inspection of the building, 
and therefore should be required to disclose that relevant information to 
the buyer.  Again the point is an obvious one, but living in the home full 
time over a period of years clearly provides the seller with more and 
better access to the dwelling and the pertinent facts regarding the quality 
 42. Id.  In this setting, information that would be deliberately acquired would be 
information obtained by a housing inspector if hired by the purchasing vendee to inspect 
the home and provide the vendee with a report on the quality of the house.  That 
information “entails costs which would not have been incurred but for the likelihood, 
however great, that the information in question would actually be produced.”  Id. 




of the dwelling as opposed to the episodic and limited searches or 
inspections undertaken by the putative buyer and the buyer’s agents. 
Consequently a review of all the theories reveals a puzzle—all point to 
disclosure by the vendor, the knower, to the vendee, the knowee.  Yet 
the rule is the opposite: at common law the seller has no duty to disclose 
any facts regarding the quality of the premises to the vendee under the 
common law doctrine of caveat emptor.  Thus, none of these theories 
can adequately explain the rationale and development of the doctrine of 
caveat emptor with respect to the sale of realty and its evolution in the 
common law. 
However, after giving the matter some thought and doing some 
historical homework, I have reached the conclusion that all three theories 
detailing when it is efficient to disclose information—deliberately acquired 
facts, wealth-producing facts, and facts inaccessible or less accessible to 
the other contracting party—do indeed support the use of a historical 
development of caveat emptor in the sale of real estate.  The conundrum 
is resolved via the recognition that the caveat emptor doctrine, in its 
pristine form, only requires the disclosure of latent dangerous defective 
conditions and has never required the dissemination or disclosure of 
patent or obvious defects.  Indeed, as the doctrine of caveat emptor has 
eroded to become a shell of the pristine common law doctrine, the one 
constant rule embodied in the doctrine, no matter what the exceptions or 
limitations on the common law doctrine, is that the seller, the knower, 
does not and has not ever had the duty to disclose patent or obvious 
defects to the knowee.  It is that limitation on the erosion of the caveat 
emptor doctrine that holds the key to the explication of the primary 
premise of this Article—the doctrine of caveat emptor, its erosion, and 
its reemergence in the guise of caveat emptor light are consistent with 
economic theories requiring the efficient disclosure of information from 
one contracting party to the other. 
Thus, it is not the doctrine of caveat emptor that has evolved to 
accommodate efficient legal theories or to adapt to the alleged change in 
bargaining power and knowledge by the contracting parties with respect 
to the sale of real estate, which is said to be the usual reason for the 
erosion of the common law doctrine of caveat emptor.43  Instead, the 
 43. The sale of residential property, traditionally viewed as an arena involving  
buyers and sellers, is increasingly the subject of legislative scrutiny.  Previously, 
buyers and sellers, dealing at arms length, were presumed to have the essential 
skills and bargaining power to negotiate an equitable transaction.  Buyers were 
presumed to investigate each potential purchase to determine whether the 
particular piece of property met the buyer’s criteria.  Upon discovering any 
undesirable characteristics or “defects” in the parcel, the buyer presumably 
presented these concerns to the seller and either used the information as a 
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focus should be on the evolution of the character of the property 
transferred that is the subject of the doctrine that has shaped and caused 
its evolution to its current form consistent with the three economic 
theories detailing the efficient disclosure of information.  That fact is 
tacitly recognized by Dean Kronman when he concludes that with one 
exception—patent defects—the information possessed by a typical 
homeowner is casually acquired information, or information that would 
have been acquired in any event.  As a result, the selling homeowner 
should disclose that information which is contra to the doctrine of caveat 
emptor.44 
Although Dean Kronman does not explain why caveat emptor was 
initially the doctrine employed by the courts with respect to the sale of 
realty, he does address the situation in which a selling party is privileged 
not to disclose even casually acquired information with respect to the 
sale of realty.  The exception occurs with respect to patent or obvious 
defects.  Since this class of defects is obvious, its disclosure is unnecessary 
since the party on whom the disclosure burden is or would be placed 
assumes that the other party is already in possession of that information 
given the patent nature of the defect.45  The key is tying that observation 
to the type of property being sold at the time that the caveat emptor 
doctrine was developed. 
At the time the common law doctrine of caveat emptor developed, the 
property being transferred was agrarian in nature and disclosure of any 
information was unnecessary because the party upon whom the 
bargaining tool to adjust the consideration in the transaction or decided that the 
defective property was no longer desirable and terminated the negotiations. 
    This format was the means of facilitating real estate transactions for many 
years, until it was considered out of harmony with modern concepts of justice. 
Steven C. Tyszka, Note, Remnants of the Doctrine of Caveat Emptor May Remain 
Despite Enactment of Michigan’s Seller Disclosure Act, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1497, 1497 
(1995) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 44. Kronman, supra note 1, at 23. 
 45. Id.  With respect to latent defects and the emerging trend to require their 
disclosure and the concomitant erosion of the doctrine of caveat emptor, Dean Kronman 
defends that erosion and characterizes it as a beneficial development from an efficiency 
or economic standpoint because when the information is casually acquired, the 
disclosing seller—the knower—is the cheapest cost avoider.  If the rule should be the 
obverse, it would be inefficient in that the “seller has made a deliberate investment in 
acquiring his knowledge which he would not have made had he known he would be 
required to disclose to purchasers of the property any defects he discovered.”  Id. at 25.  
The common law doctrine of caveat emptor, its erosion, and its current iteration are all 
efficient. 
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disclosure burden was placed—the knower-seller—assumed that the 
other party—the knowee-buyer—was already in possession of that 
information.  The buyer was in possession of this information because 
the entire quality or character of the premises was accessible to the buyer 
upon a reasonable inspection of the premises.  As a result, at the time the 
doctrine developed, disclosure of defects of the typical agrarian structure 
would have been unnecessary since the party upon whom the disclosure 
was placed correctly assumed that the other party—the purchasing 
party—was in possession of that information as a result of that party’s 
inspection of the premises.  At this stage in the development of real 
property, all defects were patent and discoverable by the buyer. 
The problem with the application of the caveat emptor doctrine to 
modern residential dwellings is that the original premise supporting the 
use of the common law doctrine of caveat emptor is no longer true—all 
defects are no longer patent.  The common law caveat emptor doctrine 
presupposes that all defects in a property are patent and that there is no 
need for the communication of them from seller to buyer.  Today, 
however, most defects are latent and not easily discoverable upon a 
visible inspection, even a carefully conducted inspection, of the premises.  It 
is the change in the nature of the dwelling that is the subject of the 
doctrine, the possession of valuable casually acquired information by the 
seller, and, lastly, the concomitant duty to disclose imposed on sellers 
today in most jurisdictions that have caused the erosion of the common 
law doctrine. 
Hence, over time patent defects became latent defects, requiring 
disclosure which is consistent with the economic theories addressed above 
because the knower was aware of these latent defects and acquired that 
information not as a result of a deliberative search for information.  
Furthermore, the seller is clearly the party who has the most efficient 
access to the dwelling to determine the quality of the premises demised.  
These facts, coupled with the additional fact that the knowledge of these 
latent defects do not create wealth, but simply cause the redistribution of 
wealth, explain why the common law doctrine of caveat emptor is 
riddled with exceptions and is no longer viable in today’s society. 
In Part II, I turn my attention to the evolution of the doctrine of caveat 
emptor to demonstrate how the changing character of the property being 
conveyed forced the exceptions to the caveat emptor doctrine that have 
now swallowed the rule.  In so doing, I confront and address a new issue 
raised by the evolution of the caveat emptor doctrine—the demise of 
caveat emptor in its common law iteration and its reemergence as caveat 
emptor light.  As the common law caveat emptor doctrine became 
inapposite to the sale of real property, courts, and subsequently legislators, 
were left to decide which facts, those that are casually acquired and 
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redistributive being the easiest to identify, must be disclosed by the 
seller to the buyer. 
I hope to demonstrate that because casually acquired information is 
determined after the sale has occurred in a transaction in which no new 
wealth is being created, because the sale of a house typically does not 
cause the creation of new assets or growth in existing assets, it is quite 
easy to come to the conclusion that any knowledge possessed by the 
seller-knower is casually acquired, redistributive information that 
must or should have been disclosed to the buyer-knowee.  The court’s 
hindsight-based decision that facts must be disclosed has ultimately 
caused the abolition of the doctrine of caveat emptor by essentially 
requiring the disclosure of every fact. 
The problem with the disclosure of all casually acquired information 
is that it is hard to police and discriminate between casually acquired and 
deliberately acquired information when the judgment is made ex post in 
a setting like the sale of residential real estate.  The problem is 
exacerbated because if the seller lives in the home, the act of living in 
the home will result in the acquisition of casually acquired information 
and deliberately acquired information, and it will be impossible to 
distinguish between the two in any principled way. 
In Part II, I address a related problem created by the ex post nature of 
the determination of whether facts are casually or deliberately acquired 
in the context of a residential real estate sale.  Once it is recognized that 
litigation will occur regarding whether disclosure was required for those 
facts which were not disclosed—this seems rather obvious but raises an 
important point that facts adequately disclosed create issues perhaps 
involving misrepresentation or fraud, but not nondisclosure—what 
courts are essentially deciding is whether a fact should have been 
disclosed after the relevance of the fact, at least to the buyer who is 
ostensibly bringing the lawsuit, has already been at least partially 
proven.46  This hindsight or ex post determination will almost inevitably 
result in a decision that it should have been disclosed if the fact affects 
the value of the premises, even those facts that the seller had no reason 
to know of or facts that the seller in good faith believed were patent or 
insignificant with respect to its impact on value.  The erosion and 
obliteration of the common law doctrine has, in effect, caused the seller 
to become the guarantor of the value of the premises as it exists on the 
 46. See infra notes 63, 65, and accompanying text. 




date of sale, warranting its value as to the state of facts as they exist on 
the date of sale.47  Hence, the doctrine of nondisclosure has come full circle 
to become the doctrine of total and absolute disclosure as to all relevant 
facts, with the relevant facts being determined much later, with hindsight, 
by a trier of fact.48 
This has led to the final piece of the puzzle—why caveat emptor light 
has emerged.  In a juridical world in which the relevance of facts are 
decided only after their relevance has been proven, it may be impossible 
for the seller to adequately perform its duty of disclosure if the seller, 
acting in good faith, is unaware of the fact, the relevance of the fact to 
the buyer or the larger real estate market, or its impact on value.49  The 
seller, as guarantor of the value of the premises, may be unwilling to act 
as guarantor as to those unknown facts or facts that later cause a 
diminution in value over which the seller has no control.  This has 
created an incentive for sellers to limit their duty of disclosure in order 
to limit their role as guarantors as to the value of the premises. This has 
led to the reemergence of caveat emptor in the guise of caveat emptor 
light.  Caveat emptor light realigns the relationship of the parties consistent 
with their expectations and establishes appropriate default rules that the 
parties can bargain in light of given their respective positions.  Furthermore, 
caveat emptor light is premised on the recognition that neither party is 
the so-called jack-of-all-trades agrarian farmer that represented the 
typical buyer and seller at the time the doctrine of caveat emptor 
emerged and came to dominate.50 
II.  CAVEAT EMPTOR: A COMMON LAW DOCTRINE GONE AWRY—           
FOR GOOD AND EFFICIENT REASONS 
The caveat emptor doctrine is a historical anomaly.  Although originally 
conceived in the Middle Ages to allocate disclosure rights between 
 47. See, e.g., Van Camp v. Bradford, 63 Ohio Misc. 2d 245, 259–60 (C.P. 1993) 
(holding the seller liable for not disclosing the property’s psychological stigma—violent 
crimes that had occurred at or near the premises—to the buyer).  Van Camp and cases 
like it represent the cutting edge of disclosure cases because information is not “visible” 
in the sense of a patent defect, but it is or can be discovered in many cases by a thorough 
search of the public record which would disclose the fact that a crime was committed on 
the subject property, that the owner died of AIDS, or that the house is haunted.  For more 
on the latter, see Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672, 674 (App. Div. 1991), 
discussed infra at note 85 and accompanying text. 
 48. For further discussion, see infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
 49. It is more common than you might think that a seller may not be aware of facts 
with respect to the quality of the premises that later cause a significant diminution in 
value.  For a discussion of this issue, see infra notes 107–09 and accompanying text. 
 50. For further discussion of this point, see infra notes 113–15 and accompanying 
text. 
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buyers and sellers of real property, the doctrine survived for centuries 
even though the nature of the property governed by the doctrine 
changed—agrarian versus residential—as did the respective knowledge 
of the parties to the transactions—the prototypical jack-of-all-trades 
farmer in the Middle Ages to the clueless buyer and seller who have 
difficulty changing light bulbs in a residence.  However, its survival was 
not without cost.  The doctrine became riddled with exceptions and 
ultimately has been effectively abolished in several jurisdictions.  
Perversely, the judicial and statutory abolition of the caveat emptor 
doctrine has paved the way for the return of the doctrine, a doctrine I 
now call caveat emptor light. 
To truly understand the issue, and obviously the evolution of the 
doctrine of caveat emptor, a historical exegesis is appropriate to place 
the issue in its appropriate historical context.  Hence, this Part is divided 
into three chronologically oriented subparts. In the first, I briefly detail 
the original (or more accurately, historical) formulation of the doctrine 
of caveat emptor tracing its origination to England, of course, and the 
common law.  From there, I document the erosion of the document by 
cases and statutes, focusing on the seller and the brokers, who are agents 
of the sellers and who have the duty to disclose certain information that 
was previously protected by the common law doctrine of caveat emptor.  
I conclude with my thesis that what is emerging is something akin to 
caveat emptor light, which requires the selling homeowner to disclose 
selective information or expressly disclaim the communication of any 
information from seller to buyer, reestablishing the default rule of caveat 
emptor as it existed at common law.  That will lead to a discussion in 
Part III of the optimal rule for disclosure and whether caveat emptor 
light is such a rule. 
A.  The Common Law Baseline 
Caveat emptor is part of a much larger Latin phrase which roughly 
translated means “let the buyer beware, who ought not be ignorant of the 
amount and nature of the interest he is about to buy, exercise caution.”51  
The doctrine first emerged in ancient Rome and was quickly embraced 
as a common law rule governing residential real estate transactions in 
 51. See James R. Pomeranz, Note, The State of Caveat Emptor in Alaska as it 
Applies to Real Property, 13 ALASKA L. REV. 237, 237 (1996). 





n the part of the 
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sixteenth-century England.52  At the time the rule developed, England 
was largely an agrarian society and the asset to which the rule applied, 
land being sold, was agrarian as well, with the land being transferred 
worth much more than the value of the structures built upon the land.53  
Since the structures constructed upon the land were so basic, and the 
knowledge of their quality was equally accessible to both parties—the 
buyer and seller—the buyer was easily able to inspect the land and 
discover any defects in the premises conveyed.  Essentially, the buyer 
and seller had equal access to the condition of the premises and 
possessed equal bargaining power with respect to their knowledge and 
value of the premises conveyed.54 
Pursuant to the traditional doctrine of caveat emptor, the seller was 
under no obligation to disclose facts known to him but unknown to the 
buyer, irrespective of their impact on value or use of the premises.55  
The buyer’s recourse was to carefully inspect the premises for defects 
and to ensure that the premises were suitable for their intended purpose.  
If the buyer’s inspection revealed some material defect, the buyer could 
reject the deal, negotiate further regarding price or remediation of the 
defect, or demand an express warranty from the seller covering the 
defect.56  Indeed, the seller was under no duty to say anything with 
respect to the condition of the premises.  In this situation, silen
lden.57 
Essentially, the common law doctrine of caveat emptor does not 
require a seller to disclose defects and precludes recovery by a buyer for 
structural and other defects in the property being sold where: (1) the 
alleged defective condition is open to observation and is discoverable 
upon a reasonable inspection; (2) the buyer has the opportunity to 
examine the premises; and (3) there was no fraud o
ndor with respect to the condition of the premises.58 
Simply put, under the traditional doctrine of caveat emptor, the seller 
 52. See Stormont v. Astoria Ltd., 889 P.2d 1059, 1062 n.5 (Alaska 1995); Nicola 
W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During Precontractual Negotiations, 24 
SETON HALL L. REV. 70, 110 (1993). 
 53. See Caryn M. Chittenden, From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Equity—The 
Implied Warranty of Quality Under the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, 27 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 571, 578 (1992). 
 54. Id.; see also Conklin v. Hurley, 428 So. 2d 654, 656–57 (Fla. 1983) 
(summarizing the history of caveat emptor). 
 55. Chittenden, supra note 53, at 578. 
 56. Id. 
 57. As Lord Cairns stated in the landmark case of Peek v. Gurney, (1873) 6 L.R.E. 
& I. App. 377, 403 (H.L.) (U.K.): “Mere non-disclosure of material facts, however 
morally censurable . . . would in my opinion, form no ground for an action in the nature 
of an action for misrepresentation.” 
 58. See Jacobs v. Racevskis, 663 N.E.2d 653, 655 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995). 
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[purchasing] plaintiff “(6) relied upon the representations, (7) was induced to 
 
is not required to disclose to the buyer any facts that might affect the 
value of the premises.59  Another way of stating this is that if the seller 
said nothing about the condition or value of the property to be conveyed 
in her negotiations with the buyer, the seller could not be liable for any 
defects in the property sold to the buyer that are subsequently discovered 
by the buyer upon taking possession of the conveyed premises.  In its 
pristine form, the doctrine of caveat emptor protected the silent seller of 
real estate whether the defects were latent or patent, whether they were 
known to the seller or not, and whether they were discoverable by 
the buyer upon a cursory or thorough inspection.  Without active 
misrepresentation or fraud, of which more anon,60 the buyer purchased 
the property as is and was indisputably 
operty following the transfer of title. 
As previously indicated, the common law doctrine of caveat emptor 
does not bar recovery against the seller when the real estate seller has 
engaged in misrepresentation with respect to the condition of the 
demised premises.  Notwithstanding the caveat emptor doctrine, under the 
common law, there are three theories pursuant to which the buyer can bring 
an action against the seller based on some species of misrepresentation 
by the seller: (1) intentional misrepresentation or fraud; (2) negligent 
misrepresentation; and (3) so-called innocent misrepresentation.  Under any 
of these three theories, the buyer must prove that the innocently, 
negligently, or intentionally misrepresented fact was material and tha
e buyer justifiably relied on the representation in making the purchase.61 
Quite clearly the common law doctrine of caveat emptor does not 
protect the seller against the buyer’s claim when the seller has actively 
misrepresented the condition of the premises and in w
chasing plaintiff can prove that the seller made: 
“(1) a material representation which is (2) false and (3) known to be false, or 
made recklessly as an assertion of fact without knowledge of its truth or falsity, 
and (4) made with the intention that it be acted upon, and (5) acted upon with 
damage. . . .”  In addition to these elements, it must also be proved that the 
 59. Again, the seller cannot misrepresent, by concealment or active statements, the 
condition of the premises to the detriment of the buyer.  For a discussion of the doctrine 
of misrepresentation, see infra notes 61–67 and accompanying text. 
 60. See infra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 61. Kenneth M. Nakasone, Seller Beware: New Law Protects Hawai‘i Home Buyers, 
18 U. HAW. L. REV. 981, 984 (1996). 




act upon them, and (8) did not know them to be false, and by the exercise of 
reasonable care could not have ascertained their falsity.”62 
Each of the numbered elements must be proven in order to establish a 
cause of action for fraud or intentional misrepresentation. 
As indicated above, the caveat emptor doctrine is or at least began as a 
rule of silence.  If the seller remains silent and takes no steps to warrant 
the condition or quality of the premises, caveat emptor provides a safe 
harbor for the seller.  However, once the seller begins to speak to the 
quality of the premises, even short of fraud, courts are willing to impose 
a duty on the seller to be truthful and nonnegligent with respect to those 
representations.  Indeed, the erosion of the common law caveat emptor 
doctrine began and continues with respect to these nonfraudulent cases 
of misrepresentation.  It is to these cases, and the erosion of the doctrine, 
that I now turn, focusing specifically on court-imposed duties to disclose. 
B.  The Erosion of the Doctrine—the Beginning of Efficient              
Mandatory Disclosure Rules 
The beginning of the erosion of the common law caveat emptor 
doctrine began with the negligent and innocent misrepresentation cases.  
These cases, which are unremarkable, laid the groundwork for the 
usurpation of the common law doctrine of caveat emptor in cases where 
the seller did exactly what was typically required by the caveat emptor 
doctrine—remaining silent and making no representation.  Furthermore, 
the cases of negligent and innocent misrepresentation began to exhibit 
the efficiency norms produced by the economic theories to disclose 
information that are addressed above.  In other words, a close review of 
these cases reveals that what is actionable is not the communication, 
which in some sense is innocent and lacks the scienter necessary to 
prove fraud, but the effect the communication has on the duty to gather 
information on the party, the buyer, to whom the communication is 
made.  It is the effect of the communication on the buyer that negates the 
safe harbor, and the rationale for, the caveat emptor doctrine. 
Negligent misrepresentation occurs when one party to a transaction 
fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or 
communicating material information about the transaction or the property 
being sold pursuant to the transaction.  As a result of this negligence or 
inadvertence, the seller supplies false information to the buyer upon 
 62. Jeff Sovern, Toward a Theory of Warranties in  Sales of New Homes: Housing 
the Implied Warranty of Advocates, Law and Economics Mavens, and Consumer 
Psychologists Under One Roof, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 13, 18 n.17 (quoting Coffin v. Dodge, 
76 A.2d 541, 543 (Me. 1950)). 
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which the buyer relies in going forward or completing the transaction.  
Thus, when a seller, without actual fraudulent intent (scienter), fails to 
exercise reasonable care and provides the buyer with incorrect information 
regarding the condition of the soon-to-be demised premises in a residential 
real estate transaction, the seller is liable for negligent misrepresentation. 
A few cases will illustrate the parameters of the cause of action.  In 
Asleson v. West Branch Land Co., the seller was liable to the buyer when 
the seller failed to verify the exact acreage that was being sold and 
asserted that the property was zoned for thirty-five townhouses, a fact 
that appeared in the multiple listing service.63  Instead, the property was 
zoned for only thirty such units.64 
Quite often the case for negligent misrepresentation is made against 
the seller’s agent, the broker, for representations made by the broker on 
behalf of its principal, the seller, to the buyer.  Often the broker is 
passing on information it received from the seller, and it is the broker’s 
negligence in verifying the information before communicating it to the 
buyer that results in the successful cause of action against the seller.65 
Innocent misrepresentation represents even more of an incursion on 
the doctrine of caveat emptor and imposes liability when there is no 
fault—no intent to deceive and no negligence with respect to the 
representation on the part of the seller.  As such, innocent misrepresentation 
is most aptly described as a species of strict liability.66  To be clear, 
innocent misrepresentation occurs when the seller makes a misrepresentation 
 63. 311 N.W.2d 533, 535 (N.D. 1981). 
 64. Id.  It is also possible for the seller to orally misrepresent a relevant fact about 
the property to the purchaser.  Thus, if the seller orally informs the buyer that she owns 
land beyond a fence boundary that is suitable for gardening and, unknown to the seller, 
the boundaries are different from those described in the deed and the seller’s 
representations, a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation will be sustained.  See 
Frona M. Powell, Relief for Innocent Misrepresentation: A Retreat From the Traditional 
Doctrine of Caveat Emptor, 19 REAL EST. L.J. 130, 132 (1990). 
 65. A case in point is Tennant v. Lawton, 615 P.2d 1305, 1308 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1980), in which the seller told the broker-realtor that the property in question had passed 
a percolation test, thereby making the property saleable, and the realtor conveyed the 
property to the buyers without verifying same.  After the closing, the buyers discovered 
that the property had not passed a percolation test and were subsequently unable to 
obtain a septic tank permit.  Id.  The Washington Court of Appeals held that the realtor 
had negligently misrepresented a material fact to the purchasers by “fail[ing] to take the 
simple steps within her area of expertise and responsibility which would have disclosed 
the absence of any health district approved site on the subject property.”  Id. at 1310. 
 66. Clarance E. Hagglund & Britton D. Weimer, Caveat Realtor: The Broker’s 
Liability for Negligent and Innocent Misrepresentations, 20 REAL EST. L.J. 149, 153 
(1991). 





of a material fact upon which the buyer justifiably relies in deciding to 
act or refrain from acting, even though the misrepresentation is not made 
fraudulently or negligently.  In this setting, once the representation is 
made, the seller and the seller’s agents have constructive knowledge of 
the defects of the real estate as it pertains to the misrepresented fact, 
whether or not those defects are discoverable by a reasonable 
inspection.67 
What is interesting and revealing about these cases is that the seller 
has no duty to make representations—to convey information—to the 
buyer, but in so doing becomes the warrantor of the information 
conveyed.  In this situation, the seller can avoid liability for innocent and 
negligent misrepresentation simply by remaining silent—avoiding any 
representations concerning the absence of defects or other information 
that is communicated to the buyer.68  Hence, the safe harbor for the 
seller in this setting is the common law doctrine of caveat emptor, 
pursuant to which the seller remains silent, and the buyer purchases the 
property based solely on the buyer’s knowledge of the property gleaned 
from the buyer’s inspection of the demised p
Furthermore, it is the recognition that the seller has deviated from the 
safe harbor of nondisclosure provided by the common law rule of caveat 
emptor that provides the key to explaining these cases as exceptions to 
the common law doctrine.  Such recognition further validates the economic 
theories detailed above regarding optimal disclosure rules.  Recall that 
under the common law doctrine of caveat emptor, it is assumed that the 
parties have both equal bargaining power and equal access to information 
concerning the condition of the premises to be conveyed.  Consequently, 
if the seller makes no representations, it is incumbent upon the buyer to 
make her own inspection of the premises to determine its quality. 
That calculus changes radically when the seller makes either a 
negligent or innocent misrepresentation to the buyer, and there is the 
requisite reliance.  In this case the reliance means that the buyer, relying 
on the information conveyed by the seller, opts not to inspect the 
premises in such a manner to verify the misinformation conveyed to the 
buyer by the seller, instead relying on the mistaken state of affairs to the 
buyer’s detriment.  By making the communication to the buyer, the 
seller is warranting that she has access to information that the buyer 
cannot obtain or need not obtain given the seller’s representations.  That 
 67. Id. at 152. 
 68. Of course, in the case of negligent misrepresentation, the seller can also avoid 
culpability by conveying accurate, nonnegligent information about the condition of the 
premises to the buyer.  Silence, however, will ensure that nonnegligent information is not 
conveyed since no information of any type would be conveyed from seller to buyer. 
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eliminates the buyer’s duty to further investigate to obtain the requisite 
information and imposes liability on the seller for the damages or harm 
that ensues. 
In addition, this deviation from the common law rule of caveat emptor 
makes perfectly good sense when it is remembered that the seller is 
privileged to make no representations regarding the state or condition of 
the premises.  By making the representation, either innocently or 
mistakenly, the seller is indicating that this is information that the seller 
acquired in her ownership of the property that is both casually acquired69 
and redistributive, as opposed to wealth-enhancing.70  This is self-evident 
from the nature of the communication.  If the information is the product 
of deliberate investment or wealth-enhancing, as described above,71 it 
would be inefficient and not in the seller’s interest to convey same to the 
buyer.72 
Take for example the cases that are addressed above with respect to 
innocent and negligent misrepresentations.  At first glance it might 
appear that the acreage being conveyed and how many units can be built 
upon the property as a result,73 the boundaries of a property as stated in a 
deed,74 and lastly, whether a property has passed a percolation test that 
will allow for a certificate of occupancy because a septic system may be 
installed,75 are facts that are or may be the product of deliberate 
investment—although I think that is stretching it; perhaps the percolation 
case provides the best case for this argument.  However, that determination 
is irrelevant because in all three settings or cases the information is in 
the public domain and subject to verification, thus making it the 
equivalent of casually acquired information—information that the seller 
has no privilege or property right in protecting from others.  The three 
facts that were the subject of the misrepresentation were easily subject to 
verification.  However, it is the very fact of the representation that 
precludes the investigation that could lead to the acquisition of 
information.  As a result, information that is available to both parties is 
controlled by one party.  Moreover, by usurping the buyer’s right to 
 69. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
 70. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
 71. See supra notes 25–35 and accompanying text. 
 72. See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text. 
 73. See supra note 63. 
 74. See supra note 64. 
 75. See supra note 65. 






obtain that information, the seller is warranting the quality and veracity 
of the information and is therefore held liable for both negligent and 
innocent misrepresentations. 
Similarly, the information conveyed by the seller to the buyer is not 
wealth-enhancing information, but simply redistributive.  This also flows 
from the fact that the information is publicly available, and the market 
has already internalized the production and publication of the information 
in the price of the property. 
Consistent with Professor Scheppele’s theory regarding the efficient 
disclosure of information, the information conveyed to the buyer by the 
seller in the negligent and innocent misrepresentation cases is, somewhat 
perversely, information that originally is accessible to both parties, 
thereby creating no duty to disclose.76  The subsequent disclosure of the 
information from the seller to the buyer in the absence of a duty to 
disclose transforms that information into information that has to be 
conveyed accurately to the buyer because the mere disclosure of the 
information, whether accurate or inaccurate, precludes the buyer from 
undergoing further investigation to obtain this information.  By conveying 
this information, the seller transforms the safe harbor of caveat emptor, 
with the expectation that both parties have equal access to information 
akin to patent defects, into information that is casually acquired and not 
wealth-enhancing, which the seller has the duty to disclose accurately to 
the buyer. 
The cost of the seller’s incorrect dissemination of information is the 
negation of the buyer’s duty to perform its obligations—undertaking an 
inspection of the premises—under the doctrine of caveat emptor.  This 
forestalls production by the buyer of “information whose acquisition 
entails costs which would . . . have been incurred but for the likelihood, 
however great, that the information in question would actually be 
produced.”77  From the buyer’s perspective, the seller’s 
representation precludes the acquisition of deliberately acquired 
information that is imposed on the buyer under the common law doctrine 
of caveat emptor.  Moreover, the buyer is able to rely on the fact that the 
information being conveyed to the buyer by the seller is accurate and 
verifiable because the seller acquired this non-wealth-en
 76. This information also need not be disclosed pursuant to Dean Kronman’s 
theory, as well as Professor Cooter and Ulen’s theory, due to the fact that although the 
information is casually acquired and redistributive, as opposed to wealth-enhancing, it is 
nevertheless information that, because of its accessibility, is deemed to be patent, and 
imposing a duty on the seller to convey that information to the buyer would be needless 
and inefficient. 
 77. Kronman, supra note 1, at 13. 
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The development of negligent and innocent misrepresentations 
represents the first erosion of the common law doctrine, and it is a 
significant one.  However, it is consistent with the economic theories 
discussed above detailing when disclosure is imposed on the knowee.  
The more significant and, at first glance, puzzling erosion of the caveat 
emptor doctrine continued with respect to cases in which there was no 
representation, either mistaken or negligent, made by the seller to the 
buyer, yet the seller was liable for damages caused by the transfer of the 
defective premises.  These “no representation” cases seem to fly in the 
face of the common law rule of caveat emptor because the seller is doing 
exactly what is required by the doctrine: remaining silent. 
In these, what I will characterize for want of a better term, “passive 
misrepresentation” cases, the courts have laid the groundwork for 
imposing a mandatory duty to disclose information.  As a result of these 
cases, which are now legion, in which the seller says nothing and yet is 
held liable for nondisclosure—sometimes designated with the term 
“fraudulent nondisclosure”—the caveat emptor doctrine has been 
negated.78  As Professor Weinberger has noted: 
[C]ourts have recognized a duty to disclose information to prospective 
purchasers in a variety of contexts involving cracked foundations, leaking roofs, 
structural defects, unstable soil conditions, infestation by cockroaches, and 
defective sewage disposal.  Additionally, nondisclosure of environmental 
contamination, radon, and asbestos has become a fertile source of litigation in 
recent years. 
    A legal duty to “speak up” does not arise simply because two parties may 
have been sitting across the bargaining table when a deal was struck between 
them.  The common theme running through the nondisclosure jurisprudence is 
the prevention of situations in which buyers labor under serious misapprehension 
and are unable to rationally assess the true level of risk involved in the bargain.  
The duty to disclose arises when contracting parties do not stand on equal 
footing because one possesses superior knowledge not reasonably available to 
the other.79 
One particularly egregious case is State v. Brooks, in which a buyer 
purchased a home with a carbon monoxide leak in the home’s snow 
 78. See Renee D. Braeunig, Note, Johnson v. Davis: New Liability for Fraudulent 
Nondisclosure in Real Property Transactions, 11 NOVA L. REV. 145, 145 (1986); Steven 
W. Koslovsky, To Disclose or Not to Disclose: An Overview of Fraudulent 
Nondisclosure, 50 J. MO. B. 161, 161 (1994). 
 79. Alan M. Weinberger, Let the Buyer Be Well Informed?—Doubting the Demise 
of Caveat Emptor, 55 MD. L. REV. 387, 402–03 (1986) (footnotes omitted).  As discussed 
previously, this duty to disclose is also supported by the fact that the information 
disclosed is casually acquired information and redistributive in nature. 




melting unit, which the buyer was unaware of and which was not 
discoverable by a casual inspection of the premises.80  The seller, 
however, was aware of the defect because his girlfriend and daughter 
became ill from breathing the fumes before he sold the house.  The 
repairman, who serviced the unit and discovered the defect, told the 
seller he was playing Russian roulette with his life if he did not get the 
system repaired.  Instead of making the repairs, the seller hired a realtor 
and sold the home to the buyers without disclosing the defect.  When the 
buyer, his wife, and his four-year-old daughter died of carbon monoxide 
poisoning, the seller was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and 
Vermont abandoned the doctrine of caveat emptor with respect to 
dangerous conditions that are not discoverable upon an inspection by the 
buyer.81 
In addition to physical defects that impact the quality and the value of 
the real estate being conveyed, recent cases have focused on so-called 
psychological defects that impair the value of the premises.  Like 
physical defects, these psychological defects, which are known to the 
seller and not to the buyer, give rise to a claim for damages or rescission 
with respect to the sale of residential real estate.  Again, quoting Professor 
Weinberger: 
Well-publicized cases involving murder, AIDS, and poltergeists have focused 
public and state legislative attention on an evolving legal duty to disclose the 
existence of nonphysical, psychological defects to prospective purchasers.  The 
market value of affected real estate is significantly reduced once potential 
purchasers become aware of this information.  As a result, these properties are 
sometimes described as “stigmatized.”82 
Without going through a litany of cases requiring disclosure, it is fair 
to note what all of these cases have in common: 
[I]n the vast majority of cases, material information about the condition of a 
residence will be peculiarly within seller’s knowledge and difficult for 
purchasers to obtain.  Most homebuyers [prospective purchasers] will be unable 
to achieve a parity of information with long-time homeowners, even by 
conducting a professional building inspection.  Judicial recognition that vendors 
and purchasers are not equal players challenges the basic underlying assumption 
of the doctrine of caveat emptor.83 
What these cases seem to imply is that when the defective condition is 
open to observation or otherwise reasonably discoverable, and a buyer 
has an opportunity to inspect the premises before purchasing, the seller 
may still perhaps be protected by the doctrine of caveat emptor.  The 
 80. 658 A.2d 22, 24–26 (Vt. 1995). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Weinberger, supra note 79, at 407 (footnotes omitted). 
 83. Id. at 404 (footnotes omitted). 
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problem from the seller’s perspective is the ex ante determination regarding 
what is “open to observation and otherwise discoverable.”  If the seller 
fails to make the requisite disclosure because of the belief that the defect 
is open to observation and otherwise discoverable, and the buyer later 
claims that the defect was not open, the seller runs the serious risk of 
losing if a court later makes a fact-based determination that the defect 
was not open to observation or otherwise discoverable.  This provides 
impetus to the seller to make the requisite disclosures so that the buyer 
cannot later claim that the defect was neither disclosed nor open and 
discoverable. 
The problem, of course, with the sale of a residence is that as to those 
matters that are disclosed or open and discoverable (patent defects), no 
lawsuits will arise because the parties have contemplated or discussed 
those defects, internalizing them in the bargaining process and properly 
documenting or acknowledging them.  It is only those undisclosed and 
undiscoverable defects that will later give rise to a cause of action and 
claims by the buyer that the matter should have been disclosed and 
counterclaims by the seller that the alleged defect was either obvious, 
implicitly disclosed, not material, or not known to the seller in order to 
impose a duty to disclose.  This uncertainty as to undisclosed matters has 
been responsible, in large part, for the erosion of the common law 
doctrine of caveat emptor and the imposition of caveat emptor light.
 However, before turning directly to the rise of caveat emptor light, it 
is important to note that the erosion of the common law doctrine of 
caveat emptor becomes explicable if it is acknowledged that the caveat 
emptor rule is premised not only on the basis that the information 
acquired by the seller is casually acquired and not wealth-enhancing, but 
that the seller’s duty to disclose is negated because that information is 
equally accessible to the buyer upon inspection.  When that premise is 
eroded, as it is in the cases discussed above, the premise for the entire 
doctrine is eroded and a corresponding duty is placed on the seller to 
disclose accurate information.  It is the quality and the quantity of the 
information that has caused the rise of caveat emptor light. 
C.  Caveat Emptor Light—Providing Safe Harbors for Sellers 
Recall that under the common law doctrine of caveat emptor the seller 
was privileged to say nothing about the quality of the property and could 




be confident that she would be immune from any subsequent lawsuit 
alleging defective condition of the premises sold.  Silence was the key.84  
In recent years the duty to disclose defects has been imposed on the 
seller when the seller knows of facts materially affecting the value or 
desirability of the property when those facts are known or accessible to 
the seller and not known or accessible by the buyer.85  The upshot of all 
of these cases is that in many, indeed, most states today, the seller must 
disclose not only physical defects that are latent, but also psychological 
impairments—so-called stigmatized property—arising out of past events 
occurring on the subject premises, including the fact that the house was 
formerly a “house of ill repute.”  This has led to debates regarding which 
facts must be disclosed to the seller including, most recently, a debate 
regarding whether the seller has to disclose that the house was occupied 
by someone who is or was HIV positive given the impact such 
occupancy may have on the market value of the premises.86 
 84. Home sellers in the 1950s had no obligation to mention property defects  
to buyers as long as they resisted the temptation to conceal latent defects or to 
lie about the condition of the property.  To become liable for concealment, 
sellers would have needed to do more than just keep quiet: they would have 
needed to do something such as placing a mattress over a gaping hole to hide 
dry rot and termites or painting over water stains from an unrepaired roof leak.  
As one commentator put it, in those days, sellers’ lawyers could reasonably 
have copied a page from Miranda and counseled their clients: “You have the 
right to remain silent.  Anything you say can and will be used against you 
during the contract negotiations.” 
George Lefcoe, Property Condition Disclosure Forms: How the Real Estate Industry 
Eased the Transition from Caveat Emptor to “Seller Tell All,” 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & 
TR. J. 193, 195 (2004) (footnotes omitted). 
 85. In Alexander v. McKnight, the court imposed a duty on the seller to disclose 
the existence of noisy neighbors to the potential purchasers.  9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 456 
(Ct. App. 1992).  Similarly, in Reed v. King, the court required the seller to disclose the 
fact that multiple homicides had taken place at the residence.  193 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133 
(Ct. App. 1983).  As previously mentioned at supra note 47, in Stambovsky v. Ackley, the 
court, in a very tongue-in-cheek fashion that is worth a read, held that the seller had to 
disclose the existence of a poltergeist or ghost residing in the house.  572 N.Y.S.2d 672, 
677 (App. Div. 1991).  Lastly, in Van Camp v. Bradford, the court required the seller to 
disclose that a rape had taken place in the dwelling.  63 Ohio Misc. 2d 245, 259–60 (C.P. 
1993). 
 86. Weinberger, supra note 79, at 409.  In an apparent attempt to prevent the 
courts from recognizing a wide range of psychological defects creating stigmatized 
property, legislatures in seven states—Connecticut, Georgia, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, and Utah—have enacted legislation shielding sellers from 
liability for failure to disclose that the subject property was the site of a murder, suicide, 
or other felony, or that a member of the seller’s household suffers from the HIV/AIDS 
virus.  In addition, legislatures in four states—California, Florida, Kentucky, and 
Texas—have passed laws shielding the seller from liability for failure to disclose that a 
member of the seller’s household suffers from HIV/AIDS.  See Sharlene A. McEvoy, 
Caveat Emptor Redux: “Psychologically Impacted” Property Statutes, 18 W. ST. U. L. 
REV. 579, 579 n.2 (1991). 
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Given the cases discussed above, uncertainty has arisen regarding 
which facts have to be disclosed from seller to buyer, with the seller 
running the risk that at some later date some trier of fact will determine 
that there was some fact known to the seller, but unknown to the buyer, 
that materially affected the value and should have been disclosed by the 
seller to the buyer.  This uncertain state of affairs has created two different 
results that I collectively term caveat emptor light.  The first reaction is 
for the legislature, as a result of lobbying by realtors, to create a 
mandatory disclosure form that imposes a duty on the seller to disclose 
certain facts regarding the condition of the property to the buyer, thereby 
abrogating the common law doctrine of caveat emptor.  This duty is not 
necessarily limited to disclosing defects, and indeed may even extend to 
warranting the condition of the premises per the claims made in the 
disclosure form.  The second development, which seems counterfactual, 
is the judicially or legislatively created option on the part of the seller to 
make no claims or statements with respect to the quality of the premises 
and to sell the premises as is.  This latter development looks remarkably 
similar to the common law doctrine of caveat emptor, but actually is not. 
Taking the former development first, thirty-four states, by my count, 
have now detailed statutes requiring general disclosure of the quality of 
the premises to be conveyed by either the seller or the seller’s realtor 
with respect to the condition of the premises.87  Many remaining states 
require either (1) limited disclosure by real estate brokers retained by the 
seller of material or adverse conditions affecting the value of the 
premises; or (2) disclosures by sellers of the presence of specific items 
designated by the statute such as methamphetamine labs, radon, or 
mold.88  As a result, it is fair to conclude that the vast majority of sellers 
 87. By my count, thirty-four states have enacted detailed statutes requiring some 
sort of disclosure by real estate sellers or brokers or both.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE 
§§ 2079–2079.10 (Deering 2008) (requiring disclosure of material facts by the seller’s 
broker); id. §§ 1102–1102.15 (requiring disclosure by seller). 
 88. For example: 
(b) A broker engaged by a seller shall timely disclose the following to all 
parties with whom the broker is working: 
(1) All adverse material facts pertaining to the physical condition of the 
property and improvements located on such property including but not 
limited to material defects in the property, environmental contamination, 
and facts required by statute or regulation to be disclosed which are 
actually known by the broker which could not be discovered by a 
reasonably diligent inspection of the property by the buyer; and 




of residential property in the United States, pursuant to these statutes, 
must disclose information regarding the condition or quality of the 
premises that they did not have to disclose under the common law 
doctrine of caveat emptor.89 
These statutes provide a form of safe harbor to the seller regarding the 
seller’s duty to disclose certain defects.  By complying, the seller can be 
reasonably assured that she will not be liable for the failure to disclose 
material facts that she has a duty to convey to the buyer. 
    The property condition disclosure form may be embedded in a disclosure 
statute, drafted by the state agency responsible for broker licensing, or written 
by state and local Realtors associations or brokerage firms.  Often, lawyers 
prefer using statutory forms, relying upon them as safe harbors, an assured way 
of achieving full compliance with the law.  But in this situation, no safe harbors 
can be found because the disclosure statutes do not purport to pre-empt the 
evolving common law.  Sellers remain obligated to disclose all known material 
latent defects—whether mentioned in the form or not.90 
At the other end of the statutory perspective are those statutes that 
allow the seller to sell the property with limited or no representations 
with respect to its apparent quality.91  In certain states, sellers are able to 
opt out of any disclosure requirements mandated by statute and 
essentially sell the property as is as long as no misrepresentations are 
made and latent defects are disclosed.92  Although there is some 
disagreement regarding whether these “waivers” should be allowed, the 
seller can obtain something akin to the protection of the common law 
doctrine of caveat emptor by availing herself of the statutory safe harbor 
(2) All material facts pertaining to existing adverse physical conditions in the 
immediate neighborhood within one mile of the property which are 
actually known to the broker and which could not be discovered by the 
buyer upon a diligent inspection . . . . 
GA. CODE ANN. § 10-6A-5(b) (2007). 
 89. Seller disclosure forms usually are four to eight pages, single spaced.  The  
forms vary considerably in the items covered. . . . 
     Most of the forms also list structural components, such as driveways, 
retaining walls, bearing walls, chimneys, windows, doors, exterior stucco, 
floors, foundations, roofs, sewer hook-ups, water systems, sump pumps, cut 
and fill, termite and rodent infestation.  The better ones ask about the type of 
roof (e.g., asphalt, shingle, metal), its age, the date of the last repair or 
replacement, and whether the seller has had any specific problems with it, such 
as water leakage, ice damming, or other damage, and whether the seller has 
made any insurance claims based on such damage. 
Lefcoe, supra note 84, at 232–33. 
 90. Id. at 226. 
 91. Once again, however, latent defects must be disclosed. 
 92. “Some disclosure statutes allow sellers to opt out unilaterally, some require the 
buyers’ consent, and some prohibit waivers and disclaimers entirely.  Unfortunately, few 
statutes actually specify . . . whether the waiver must take any particular form.”  Lefcoe, 
supra note 84, at 235–36 (footnotes omitted). 
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of nondisclosure, thereby shifting the burden of inspection to the 
buyer.93 
These two statutory remedies, mandatory disclosure pursuant to statutory 
mandates and disclosure of no or limited information as it pertains to 
nonlatent defects and the quality of the premises conveyed, seem to be 
polar opposites, embracing disparate policy objectives.  It seems rather 
odd to state as a matter of public policy that the seller must disclose 
pursuant to a statutory form to provide requisite information to the seller 
or, if the parties agree, in the same jurisdiction the seller can, by using 
another form, disclose no information.  The latter seems to undercut the 
former and would appear to put the seller and buyer at odds or at war 
over which form will be used in a state like Virginia or Minnesota in 
which the seller has both options.94 
On the contrary, both types of statutes serve the same purpose given 
the relative bargaining power of the parties and their access to 
information.  Consistent with economic theory and the original purpose 
of the caveat emptor doctrine, these two apparently inapposite rules have 
the same goal and effect of equalizing the bargaining power between the 
transacting parties and allowing for the efficient transfer of information 
regarding the quality of the property by and between the parties in these 
arms-length transactions.  An economic analysis of caveat emptor light 
reveals that each rule is efficiency maximizing, providing appropriate 
incentives to the buyer and seller in a complex transaction that has 
 93. Scholars are divided on whether sellers should be able to waive their common- 
law right to seller disclosure.  Some scholars contend that sellers should be 
able to waive this right.  They see no good reason to deny enforcement of a 
contract between a risk-averse seller and a risk-seeking buyer—the very model 
of an economically efficient transaction. . . . 
        A good case can be made against allowing waivers and disclaimers of 
seller disclosures.  Rational risk allocation starts with a rational risk assessment.  
Even the best home inspector is likely to overlook some defects unless the 
seller reveals them or points the inspector in the right direction.  No buyer can 
sensibly waive the seller’s disclosure until the buyer learns what the seller is 
trying not to disclose. 
Id. at 236–37. 
 94. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 513.51–.59 (West 2007) (requiring the seller to 
disclose material facts regarding the condition of the premises).  Section 513.60 
provides, however, that “[t]he written disclosure required under sections 513.52 to 
513.60 may be waived if the seller and the prospective buyer agree in writing.”  Id.          
§ 513.60; see also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-517 to -525 (2007) (stating similar provisions). 




evolved over the five centuries since the common law doctrine was 
articulated.95 
III.  CAVEAT EMPTOR LIGHT—AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
The common law doctrine of caveat emptor is predicated on two 
fundamental assumptions: the first assumption is that the premises being 
conveyed are simple and easy to inspect, while the second is that each 
party to the transaction has equal access to information regarding the 
quality of the premises conveyed.  The second premise or assumption 
follows logically from the first.  What is interesting to note is that at the 
time the doctrine of caveat emptor developed, the fact that the seller 
owned the property for a period of time was irrelevant in terms of what I 
characterize as the “equal access principle” with respect to the conveyed 
property.  It was assumed at common law that the seller did not possess 
information that was not accessible to the buyer following the buyer’s 
visible inspection of the premises, regardless of how long the seller 
owned the property. 
At the time the doctrine developed, this was a factually accurate 
assumption.  Without the mechanical, complex plumbing, heating, air, 
and ventilation systems that are integral to a modern dwelling—along 
with other factors today such as a nontoxic, non-mold, non-radon, et 
cetera environment—the property being conveyed at common law 
consisted typically of four walls, a dirt floor, and a rudimentary, typically 
thatched, roof.96  The kitchen, if you could call it that, consisted of a 
stone hearth in the middle of the room.97  There was, of course, no indoor 
plumbing and nothing akin to a modern bathroom.  There were rarely 
windows and the door was, well, a wooden door.98  Hence, inspecting 
the premises for defects was a relatively easy task for the buyer.  Indeed, 
given the condition of the housing or dwelling to be conveyed, it is hard 
to imagine what could be viewed as a defective dwelling.99  Nevertheless, 
what information there was to be gleaned about the condition of the 
premises could easily be accomplished by a visual inspection of the 
premises. 
 95. See supra Part II.B. 
 96. See Learner.org, The Middle Ages—More About Homes, http://www.learner.org/ 
exhibits/middleages/morehome.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2008). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. I assume that if the walls were rotted or the roof failed to keep water out, those 
things were discoverable upon visually inspecting the premises.  Beyond that, I am not 
sure what a buyer would look for to determine that the premises were defective and 
uninhabitable. 
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The bottom line at common law is that the owner-seller’s use and 
occupation of the premises, no matter how long, gave that seller no 
advantage or extra insight or information with respect to the soon to be 
conveyed premises.  Thus, consistent with the economic theories of 
Kronman, Cooter and Ulen, and Scheppele, there should be no duty to 
disclose information from seller to buyer with respect to conveyed 
property.100  Ergo, the common law doctrine of caveat emptor—no duty 
to disclose and the seller’s privilege to remain silent. 
Fast forward to the last forty years as the doctrine of caveat emptor 
has been eroded.  The modern dwelling bears little resemblance to the 
dwelling conveyed in the Middle Ages.  Suffice it to say, the modern 
dwelling, replete with modern plumbing, heating, ventilation and air 
conditioning systems, complex lighting and electrical systems, powered 
by gas, electricity with heat pumps, and furnaces, built with composite 
and nonnatural materials, four to five times the size of the Middle Age 
dwellings, costing hundreds of thousands of dollars,101 cannot be compared 
to the dwelling conveyed in the Middle Ages. 
Not only has the complexity of the dwelling changed, just as 
importantly, the level of complexity of the dwelling or structure is 
magnified and exacerbated by the fact that dwellings are themselves 
largely unique and nonfungible.102  Whereas the dwelling conveyed in 
the Middle Ages was largely indistinguishable from other dwellings 
being built and sold at the same time—in large part due to the 
rudimentary nature of the structure—today’s modern dwelling is anything 
but uniform and typical.  Quite the contrary, most homeowners and 
builders seek and prize individuality and uniqueness and the more 
unique a dwelling, the more valuable it may be as a result. 
 100. See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text. 
 101. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the median sale price of new one-family 
houses in the United States was $240,900 in 2005.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2007, at 603 (2006). 
 102. It is hornbook law that specific performance will be granted with respect to 
real estate contracts because the subject of the contract, real property, is by definition 
unique.  See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 
355 (1978).  At common law, the land made the contract unique, justifying the remedy of 
specific performance.  Today it could be argued that the dwelling that sits on the land 
and its uniqueness are what justify the remedy of specific performance.  See JOHNSON, 
supra note 9, § 5.04(A).  But see Centex Homes Corp. v. Boag, 320 A.2d 194, 198–99 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) (refusing to allow specific performance where the object 
of the suit was one of 3600 condominium apartments which were held to be nonunique 
and fungible). 




I contend that a comparison of one hundred dwellings in a community 
chosen at random would reveal one hundred different homes when 
measured by size, design, features, complexity, et cetera.  That uniqueness 
increases, and in some cases makes impossible, the search cost for the 
average buyer purchasing property.  The idiopathic nature of the dwelling 
being sold precludes the buyer from becoming an expert ex ante with 
respect to the dwelling being purchased.  The buyer cannot school 
herself on what to look for when purchasing a home because the buyer 
cannot determine the type of home, and its various features, that the 
buyer will ultimately purchase.  Further, given the complexity of the 
dwelling conveyed, even if the buyer could identify ex ante the type and 
features of the dwelling conveyed, the effort it would take to educate the 
buyer in order to qualify the buyer to make a meaningful inspection 
would be and is prohibitive.103 
Just as importantly, the status of seller and buyer has changed radically 
as well.  The common law doctrine of caveat emptor presupposes that the 
parties have equal bargaining power with respect to the condition of the 
premises and that each can independently verify the condition of the 
premises.  That supposition, accurate with the jack-of-all-trades vendor 
and vendee at common law, is totally inaccurate with respect to the skills 
and knowledge of the seller and buyer today, which is not to say that the 
seller is more skilled than the buyer in assessing the condition of the 
premises or detecting defects.  Neither party is skilled at assessing the 
quality of the premises; so to that extent, there is equality of bargaining 
power.  However, that equality changes given the seller’s occupation of 
the premises and the knowledge of the condition of the premises 
acquired as a result. 
Putting these three factors together—the complexity of the dwelling, 
the uniqueness of dwellings being conveyed, and the lack of skills 
possessed by the buyer, and to a lesser extent, by the seller—results in a 
transaction that is radically different from the transaction of a dwelling 
in the Middle Ages.  The continued imposition of a doctrine, caveat 
emptor, on a transaction in which the parties possessed asymmetrical 
information about the property conveyed caused the erosion of the 
doctrine as detailed above.104  The cases finding liability for nondisclosure 
are a logical outgrowth of the change in bargaining power and knowledge 
 103. The increase in the use of a professional home inspector for the sale of 
residential realty is a natural byproduct of the increased complexity of the dwelling.  
However, as discussed supra at note 43 and accompanying text, even hiring a 
professional inspector to inspect a home prior to the sale does not result in the 
equalization of bargaining power and the playing field between buyer and seller with 
respect to information regarding the condition of the premises. 
 104. See supra Part II.B. 
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possessed by seller and buyer with respect to the condition of the 
premises and are easily explainable pursuant to the economic theories 
dealt with above.105 
A.  The Development of Mandatory Disclosure Rules:                                  
The New Safe Harbor 
The passive nondisclosure cases which are premised on the seller’s 
superior knowledge of the dwelling as a result of the seller’s habitation 
of the dwelling is consistent with all three theories because the 
information possessed by the seller is casually acquired, redistributive, 
and accessible to the seller as opposed to the buyer.  Hence, it makes perfect 
sense that caveat emptor would be jettisoned in favor of a disclosure 
rule.  What is interesting are the two inapposite default rules that have 
developed as exceptions to the common law doctrine of caveat emptor.  
At first glance, the safe harbor of mandatory disclosure of a prescribed 
laundry list of items alongside a safe harbor of no disclosure—
essentially a return to the common law doctrine of caveat emptor—
would seem counter factual and self-defeating.  However, given the 
relationship between seller and buyer, the fact that the determination of a 
breach of duty of disclosure is made with judicial hindsight, and the 
preexistence of the common law rule as a default rule between buyer and 
seller, have combined to produce these two seemingly disparate safe 
harbor outcomes. 
Perhaps the most important fact leading to mandatory disclosure 
statutes is the fact that decisions breaching the common law rule of 
caveat emptor are made after the sale has occurred.  It may take a while 
to connect this, but the problem with the erosion of the caveat emptor 
doctrine is that one cannot predict ex ante which information must be 
disclosed to the buyer by the seller.  Even with respect to casually 
acquired information that is redistributive and accessible to one party to 
the transaction, the problem is determining which of these casually 
acquired facts must be disclosed to the buyer ex ante.  What has heretofore 
gone unnoticed and unrecognized is that the seller’s relationship to the 
land is akin to what has, in another context, been characterized as a 
relational contract.106  That may seem to be an odd claim, but it is one 
 105. See supra Part II.B. 
 106. A relational contract is defined as follows: 




that may explain why the erosion of caveat emptor has occurred in the 
manner described. 
It is beyond doubt that the knowledge of the premises acquired by an 
owner of property is casually acquired and merely redistributive.  
Focusing on access, it is also clear that the seller has greater access to 
these facts than the buyer.  The real question, however, is which facts 
must be disclosed to the buyer given the seller’s greater knowledge and 
access to the home.  A homeowner acquires knowledge of his property 
that is both vast and unique.  It is vast given the complexity of the 
property today and the owner’s lengthy occupancy of the premises.107  It 
is unique because it applies only to the land or property being sold.  
Given the permanence of property, the myriad of factors that can affect 
value, both objective and subjective, and the degree and volume of the 
casually acquired information that is produced and known to the seller, 
which is not uniform among sellers as not all sellers living in the same 
house for the same period would have the same knowledge of casually 
acquired facts,108 how is the determination made regarding which facts 
must be disclosed to the buyer? 
The answer to that question is impossible to predict without knowing 
the knowledge of the seller, the needs of the buyer, and the condition of 
the property.  The seller’s position is akin to that of a relational 
contractor because ex ante the seller is unable to reduce the knowledge 
A contract is relational to the extent that the parties are incapable of reducing 
important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations.  Such 
definitive obligations may be impractical because of inability to identify uncertain 
future conditions or because of inability to characterize complex adaptations 
adequately even when the contingencies themselves can be identified in 
advance. . . .  [L]ong-term contracts are more likely than short-term agreements to 
fit this conceptualization, but temporal extension per se is not the defining 
characteristic. 
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 
1089, 1091 (1981). 
 107. Although I have not developed a formal formula to express this sentiment, I 
think it is fair to state that the longer the owner has owned the property, the more 
knowledge she accumulates regarding its condition, quality, defects, et cetera.  Indeed, 
my thesis is premised on the notion that an owner who has never occupied the 
premises—say, someone who has inherited property and is selling it soon after—would 
have no or a very limited duty to disclose facts regarding the property given her lack of 
familiarity with the premises. 
 108. This assumes that the skill of the homeowner-seller may impact the data that is 
acquired during one’s period of occupancy.  It seems reasonable to assume that one 
seller noticing a few inches of damaged wood may recognize termite infestation—only 
because this particular unlucky homeowner previously lived in a house with extensive 
termite damage—whereas a neophyte homeowner may not.  See, e.g., MICHAEL F. 
POTTER, UNIV. OF KY. COLL. OF AGRIC., PROTECTING YOUR HOME AGAINST TERMITES, 
http://www.ca.uky.edu/entomology/entfacts/entfactpdf/ef605.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 
2008). 
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that he has of the premises to a well-defined obligation.  Deciding with 
certainty or uniformity which facts must be disclosed ex ante is 
impractical because of the complexity of the dwelling, the temporal 
nature of the relationship—the longer the ownership, the more knowledge 
one acquires—and, perhaps most importantly, the contingencies that can 
be identified in advance as being relevant.  Take for example, the infestation 
of termites.  As noted, one seller may be aware of a potential termite 
infestation given the wood damage that he has seen accumulate over a 
period of time.  Another seller, an ignorant seller, may not.  However, 
after the property is sold and the buyer discovers the existence and 
extent of the termite infestation, it is inevitable that the seller will be 
sued for passive misrepresentation or nondisclosure if the termite 
infestation remained undisclosed.  The trier of fact will determine that 
the reasonable seller would know of the termite infestation and hold the 
seller liable, notwithstanding his claim of ignorance. 
What is even more frustrating to the seller is that the seller will 
disclose all those things that are known or believed to be known or 
relevant to the buyer but will not be able to predict ex ante all of those 
facts.  It stands to reason that if the seller believes the fact to be relevant 
to the buyer, the seller will disclose that fact.  It is only those facts that 
the seller is either unaware of or believes to be trivial and unimportant 
that the seller will refuse to disclose.109  And here is the problem or 
conundrum: a truthful and honest seller will have in her possession 
millions of facts—knowledge—about the house being sold and will have 
to determine which ones to disclose to the buyer.  Choose wrong, and 
the seller exposes himself to liability. 
Take, for example, the psychic harm cases.  On the one hand, these 
cases seem ludicrous because they require the seller to disclose stigmatic 
harms to the property.  From the seller’s perspective, how does she 
determine which harms are stigmatic?  Noisy neighbors, a skunk under 
 109. The objection to this assertion is that a seller will intentionally omit the 
disclosure of facts that reflect negatively on the value of the property in order to 
consummate the sale of the property.  This strategy is irrational and inefficient because, 
given the permanency of property and the persistence of defects, this will lead to a 
lawsuit that the seller will likely lose.  Instead of negotiating a price to reflect the 
existence of the defect—transacting over a property rule—the seller would be voluntarily 
choosing to exchange this property rule for a liability rule in which a court would ex post 
set the damages to be assessed against the seller.  Given the uncertainty with respect to 
damage awards, it makes much more sense for the seller to accurately and adequately 
disclose all defects when there is a rule requiring disclosure of material facts. 




the rear porch, a swastika painted on the wall five years ago, a break-in 
and robbery two years ago, a rape that occurred when the home was 
occupied by a prior owner, or the fact that the house was a fraternity 
twelve years ago?  The list goes on and on.  On the other hand, when the 
buyer, after the sale, presents evidence that any one of these occurrences 
is relevant to her and impacts the property’s value, the court has to 
determine whether that fact should have been disclosed.110  In some 
cases they will find for the buyer, in others for the seller given the 
evidence presented. 
Furthermore, many of these cases will be correctly decided because 
what the courts are attempting to do, with limited success, is to achieve 
the correct balance between disclosure and nondisclosure of information 
as mandated by the efficiency norms discussed above.  Given the losses 
that occur as a result of nondisclosure, the lack of accessibility and the 
fact that this is indeed casually acquired information, the courts are 
correctly imposing disclosure duties on sellers.  However these decisions 
also create problems for the seller seeking to comply with the new 
disclosure regime due to the complexity of the modern dwelling—how 
does one determine what is adequate disclosure, especially when that 
disclosure requirement is often impacted by the buyer’s knowledge and 
proposed future use of the premises? 
The response on one hand is the formulation of mandatory disclosure 
rules that prescribe which conditions must be disclosed by the seller to 
the buyer and provide the seller with a safe harbor once there is 
compliance.  Given the seller’s relational ownership of the property, the 
knowledge acquired as a result, and the imposition of the duty to 
disclose imposed, that duty has to be circumscribed—homogenized, if 
you will—by rules limiting the duty to reduce the seller’s exposure ex 
post.  This mandatory disclosure also serves a related function in the 
identification and communication of those common facts regarding the 
condition of the premises that should or are relevant to most or all sellers 
and buyers.  It thereby eliminates from the disclosure requirement 
idiopathic facts that are important to the buyer, and perhaps known to 
the seller, and impact value.  As a result, it places the burden on the 
buyer who is interested in either the verification or elimination of the 
idiopathic fact that is relevant to that buyer to verify the existence of that 
fact or verify its elimination or nonoccurrence with respect to the 
property conveyed.  The new mandatory disclosure rules, therefore, shift 
the burden to the buyer to elicit information regarding the condition of 
 110. Once again, it should be self-evident that if the seller had any inkling that the 
fact would be the subject of a later lawsuit, the seller would have disclosed the fact to the 
buyer.  See supra note 109. 
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the premises once the baseline determination mandated by the statute is 
made from seller to buyer. 
B.  The Reemergence of Silence, The Return of Caveat Emptor 
At the other end of the spectrum is the reemergence of the common 
law doctrine of caveat emptor, but not as an uncommunicated default 
rule that the parties ostensibly bargain in light of and with full 
knowledge.  Recall that at common law the prevailing rule was silence, 
and it was assumed by all, both buyer and seller, that caveat emptor was 
the norm and that if the seller opted out of the norm, by making a 
representation regarding the quality of the property, that representation 
had to be accurate and truthful.111  The reemergence of caveat emptor in 
those states that allow the seller to remain silent is not premised on both 
the buyer and seller having knowledge that the caveat emptor rule is the 
standard default rule in the sale of real property.112 
Quite the contrary, caveat emptor, or seller’s silence, can only be 
deployed in these states if that doctrine is essentially chosen by the seller 
and communicated expressly to the buyer.  The default, or off-the-rack 
rule, that the parties bargain in light of, is disclosure, but in these states 
the parties may opt out of the default rule by choosing caveat emptor.  
Consequently, to some extent, the law has come full circle in this area in 
those states where the seller is privileged to make no disclosure to the 
buyer as long as that fact is clearly communicated to the buyer prior to 
the consummation of the sale. 
Has this return to an express caveat emptor accomplished anything?  
Yes, I believe so, and the key, once again, is to focus on the parties’ 
knowledge of the property and access to information.  At common law 
where the default rule was caveat emptor, the law presumed the parties 
were aware of the default rule because of the equal access and equal 
bargaining power that the parties possessed.  The modern buyer and 
seller, however, do not have that equal access to information, nor the 
equal bargaining power possessed by their historic predecessors.  In the 
modern setting, the imposition of a default rule of caveat emptor puts the 
buyer at a serious disadvantage unless the buyer is made aware of the 
fact that she has a duty to undertake an investigation of the property 
because the property is indeed being sold as is.  In other words, the 
 111. See supra notes 55–62 and accompanying text. 
 112. See supra notes 96–100 and accompanying text. 




common law default rule is not aligned with the parties’ reasonable 
expectations in the modern transaction.  The new default rule, which 
requires the seller to put the buyer on notice with respect to his 
disadvantaged position in terms of access to information regarding 
quality of the premises, corrects this lacuna. 
The common law caveat emptor doctrine is also premised on the 
supposition that the putative buyer may casually acquire information 
regarding the quality of the premises based on the buyer’s self-inspection of 
the premises.  As pointed out above, today’s buyer is ill-equipped to 
undertake a meaningful and quality inspection of the premises, and the 
seller’s notification to the buyer that the property is being sold as is 
serves as notification to the buyer to obtain such an inspection or 
purchase or “let the buyer beware, who ought not be ignorant of the 
amount and the nature of the interest he is about to buy, exercise 
caution.”113 
This new safe harbor for nondisclosure differs from the common law 
because it assumes that there is no equal bargaining power or equal 
access between buyer and seller—the seller may have access to 
information that is casually acquired, but that information cannot be 
casually acquired by the buyer—but nevertheless places the burden on 
the seller to notify the buyer that there is potentially valuable information 
regarding the quality of the property that may be acquired by the buyer 
by undertaking a thorough and meaningful investigation.  In effect, the 
default rule has changed to alert the buyer and align with the parties’ 
expectations with respect to the parties’ duties for information seeking or 
gathering. 
Hence, there have been two shifts in the law of caveat emptor in 
response to the change in the character of the property and the 
diminution of the assessment skills of the seller and buyer.  First, given 
the myriad of details that are learned about the property by the seller 
given the seller’s occupancy and its possible relevance to the buyer, the 
law now provides a safe harbor by dictating what must be disclosed.  
What seems to be the converse is the development of the doctrine that 
permits the seller to make no disclosure.  This rule is premised on the 
notion that the buyer can undertake a meaningful inspection of the 
premises, but only if alerted to do so by the seller. 
The first shift in the caveat emptor doctrine—mandatory disclosure 
rules—levels the playing field and puts the parties back into the same 
position they were in before the erosion of caveat emptor.  By that I 
mean that the first shift guarantees equal access to information and equal 
 113. Pomeranz, supra note 51; see also supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text. 
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bargaining power by prescribing which information must be disclosed.  
It therefore prevents opportunistic behavior on the part of the seller, but 
also assures a baseline state of information for the buyer and provides a 
starting point to the acquisition of additional information.  The second 
shift in the caveat emptor doctrine, nondisclosure, accomplishes the same 
result, equality of access and bargaining power, by expressly shifting to 
the buyer the duty to deliberately acquire information.  In effect, this 
second rule presupposes that once no casually acquired information is 
communicated from seller to buyer, the buyer will make deliberate 
investment in acquiring the requisite information since it may not be 
casually acquired from the seller.114 
What the seller cannot do in those jurisdictions which have adopted 
one or both of these two new rules, mandatory disclosure or no 
disclosure, is telling and informative.  The seller cannot choose which 
facts to disclose and rely on the truth of those statements to serve as a 
safe harbor from liability.  It is the selectivity of the disclosure that 
creates issues because it may assure the buyer that other facts either are 
unimportant or not necessary to be disclosed.  The selectivity of the 
disclosure—some facts and not others—can easily lead to liability for 
innocent misrepresentation.115 
IV.  FROM CRYSTALS TO MUD TO CRYSTALS: THE IMPACT OF 
TECHNOLOGY AND CHANGE 
Professor Rose’s oft-cited article, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 
elegantly presents a theory about how crystal rules in property—
hard-edged rules that are definitive and easy to apply and manage—are 
often replaced by what she characterizes as “fuzzy, ambiguous rules of 
decision,” or mud rules.116  Crystal rules are said to emerge when goods 
or resources become scarce and parties must trade and bargain over 
these valuable entitlements.  The puzzle, as articulated by Professor 
Rose, is why then are mud rules substituted for crystal rules, especially 
 114. Although this seems contrary to the efficient theory of disclosure of information, 
requiring the buyer to make an investment in acquiring information that could be easily 
conveyed to the buyer by the seller, the fallacy of that statement or position is that the 
seller cannot determine ex ante which facts must be conveyed.  See supra notes 109–10 
and accompanying text. 
 115. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
 116. Rose, supra note 11, at 577–78. 




when these crystal rules, once muddied, are replaced by crystal rules, 
which are then subjected to being muddied anew?117 
One prime example,118 cited by Professor Rose, of this modification- 
crystallization cycle is the common law doctrine of caveat emptor, 
which she states began as a crystal rule—let the buyer beware—but has 
evolved into a mud rule, given the myriad exceptions to the common law 
rule for which the seller can be held liable for failure to disclose 
defects.119 
    For several hundred years, and right up to the last few decades, caveat emptor 
was the staple fare of the law of real estate purchases, at least for buildings 
already constructed.  The purchaser was deemed perfectly capable of inspecting 
the property and deciding for himself whether he wanted it, and if anyone were 
foolish enough to buy a pig in a poke, he deserved what he got.  Short of 
outright fraud that would mislead the buyer, the seller had no duties to disclose 
anything at all. 
    One chink in this otherwise smooth wall was the doctrine of “latent defects,” 
which, like the exception for fraud, suggested that perhaps the buyer really can’t 
figure things out entirely. . . . 
    Within the last few decades, the movement to mud in this area has become 
even more pronounced as some courts and legal commentators maintain that 
builder/vendors implicitly warrant a new house “habitable.”120 
 117. Quite aside from the wealth transfer that may accompany a change in the rules,  
then, the change [from crystal to mud rules] may sharply alter the clarity of the 
relationship between the parties.  But a move to the uncertainty of mud seems 
disruptive to the very practice of a private property/contractual exchange 
society.  Thus, it is hardly surprising that we individually and collectively 
attempt to clear up the mud with new crystal rules—as when private parties 
contract out of ambiguous warranties, or when legislatures pass new versions 
of crystalline record systems—only to be overruled later, when courts once 
again reinstate mud in a different form. 
        These odd permutations on the scarcity story must give us pause.  Why 
should we shift back and forth instead of opting for crystal when we have 
greater scarcity [of resources]?  Is there some advantage to mud rules that the 
courts are paying attention to?  And if so, why do we not opt for mud rules 
instead? 
Id. at 579–80 (footnotes omitted). 
 118. Id. at 580–83.  Other doctrines that have allegedly gone through a similar 
process are: (1) mortgage foreclosures, which were once strictly enforced when there 
was a default on the mortgage—an objective fact—to the current state of affairs in which 
the mortgagor is given the right of the “equity of redemption” in certain situations that 
cannot ordinarily be conveyed to the mortgagee by the mortgagor ex ante; and (2) 
recording acts, which evolved from strict “race” statutes in which the first to record—an 
objective fact—prevailed over those subsequent into “notice” and “race-notice” 
recording acts that precluded the first to record from prevailing if that prior recorder had 
“notice” of another’s interest in the property.  Id. at 583–90. 
 119. For more on the exceptions, see supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. 
 120. Rose, supra note 11, at 580–81 (footnotes omitted). 
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Moreover, what I have characterized as the reemergence of caveat 
emptor in the guise of caveat emptor light,121 Professor Rose characterizes, 
in part, as the reemergence of a crystal rule: 
    But there is a countermove as well: Even if the legal rules have moved 
toward mud, private bargainers often try to install their own little crystalline 
systems through contractual waivers of warranties or disclosure duties (for 
example, the “as is” or “no warranty” sale).  These private efforts in effect move 
things into the pattern of a circle, from crystal to mud and back to crystal.  And 
the circle turns once again when the courts ban such waivers, as they sometimes 
do, and firmly re-establish a rule of mud—only to be followed by even more 
artful waivers.122 
In her brief essay, Professor Rose speculates that the crystal rules, 
which are more efficient rules and therefore favored by academics, 
become mud rules because of their overuse and extension to areas for 
which they were not originally designed.  As a result, these crystal rules 
become ill-suited to police and regulate the transactions they were 
promulgated to govern: 
    But the driving force of the movement to mud rules seems to be an overuse in 
the “commons” of the crystal rules themselves: We are tempted to take rules 
that are simple and informative in one context—as, for example, “first in time, 
first in right” may be in a small community—and extend them to different or 
more complex situations, where the consequences may be unexpected and 
confusing.  It is in these “overload” situations that crystal rules may ultimately 
impede trade.123 
Another factor contributing to mud rather than crystal rules pertains to 
the relationship between the contracting parties.  Professor Rose’s 
theory, supported by existing economic literature, is that we are more 
likely to find crystal rules employed when the contracting parties are 
engaged in a one-shot, contingent contracting relationship rather than a 
relational contract.124  Mud rules are used in the relational context 
because they allegedly provide the flexibility necessary for the parties to 
make adjustments as their relationship develops and matures. 
    But what is easily overlooked is that mud rules, too, attempt to recreate an 
underlying non-legal trading community in which confidence is possible.  In 
those communities, the members tend to readjust for future complications, rather 
than drive hard bargains.  Mud rules mimic a pattern of post hoc readjustments that 
people would make if they were in an ongoing relationship with each other. . . . 
 121. See supra notes 84–95 and accompanying text. 
 122. Rose, supra note 11, at 582–83 (footnotes omitted). 
 123. Id. at 600 (footnotes omitted). 
 124. See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text. 




    Now we can see why crystal and mud are a matched pair.  Both are distilled 
from a kind of non-legal commercial context where people already in some 
relationship arrive at more or less imperfect understandings at the outset and 
expect post hoc readjustments when circumstances require.  Just as the parties 
call on courts to enforce promises and protect entitlements that would otherwise 
be enforced by the threat of informal sanctions, so too do they call on the courts 
to figure out the post hoc readjustments that would otherwise have been made 
by the parties themselves.125 
The final piece of the puzzle, according to Professor Rose, is the 
tendency of the judiciary to impose mud rules in resolving disputes that 
it adjudicates due to the ex post nature of adjudication.126  To sum up: 
    Here, then, the circular pattern emerges: If things matter to us, we try to place 
clear bounds around them when we make up rules for our dealings with 
strangers so that we can invest in the things or trade them.  The overloading of 
clear systems, however, may lead to forfeitures—dramatic losses that we can 
only see post hoc, and whose post hoc avoidance makes us (as judges) muddy 
the boundaries we have drawn.  Then, at some point we may become so stymied 
by muddiness that as rulemakers we will start over with new boundaries, 
followed by new muddiness, and so on.127 
Caveat emptor, then, represents the epitome of a rule that evolves 
from crystal to mud and thence to crystal.  First, crystal rules are 
extended—overused—to situations that are inapposite leading to 
inefficient and unjust outcomes.  Caveat emptor, in its pristine common 
law form, applied to a very simple structure in which all defects were 
essentially immediately visible.128  Furthermore, the seller, by residing 
in the dwelling, gained no particular unique knowledge of the premises 
as a result.  Hence, the parties to the common law transaction possessed 
equal bargaining power and equal knowledge with respect to the quality 
of the building.  Subsequently, as a result of the increasing complexity of 
the dwelling, these positions changed, although the doctrine did not.  
Sellers became more knowledgeable about defects in the premises that 
were not easily discoverable by the buyer.  As a result, when the buyer 
found himself fleeced, now in the role of the mope, to use Professor 
 125. Rose, supra note 11, at 602–03. 
 126. [J]udges, who see everything ex post, really cannot help but be influenced  
by their ex post perspectives.  They lean ever so slightly to mud, in order to 
save the fools from forfeiture at the hands of scoundrels.  Indeed, if judges have 
even an occasional preference for post hoc readjustments, to avoid forfeiture, 
this preference will gradually place an accretion of mud rules over people’s 
crystalline arrangements.  These considerations suggest a modification of 
claims about the efficiency of common law adjudication.  We are more likely 
to find that judicial solutions veer towards mud rules, while it is legislatures 
that are more apt to join with private parties as “rulemakers” with a tilt towards 
crystal. 
Id. at 603–04 (footnotes omitted). 
 127. Id. at 604. 
 128. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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Rose’s terminology,129 courts were more willing to muddy the crystal 
rule to provide exceptions in order to grant the buyer relief from her 
necessitous circ
Second, although the contract is not relational, the requirement that 
information not be conveyed, as allowed by caveat emptor, is once again 
inapposite in a situation where the seller acquires information in a 
relational context and is privileged not to convey same in the context of 
the contingent contract entered into with the buyer.  That inequality of 
bargaining power—relational knowledge in a contingent contract setting— 
leads to scoundrels fleecing, sometimes inadvertently, sometimes not, 
the foolish (mope) buyers who fail to adequately protect themselves by 
undertaking an adequate inspection and the acquisition of the necessary 
information regarding the quality of the premises.  Just as predicted by 
Professor Rose, courts in these settings were moved to make post hoc 
readjustments that led to the erosion of the doctrine and resulted in the 
imposition of a mud rule.  
But in addition to the three factors that Professor Rose has identified 
to explicate why crystals turn to mud and thence crystals, an examination of 
caveat emptor reveals two heretofore additional reasons why these rules 
change and become muddied.  Professor Rose’s theory is incomplete in 
one respect because she does not take into account how the property or 
resource that is the subject of the crystal rule might also evolve to 
become inapposite to the crystal rule.130  In other words, these are not 
static rules or doctrines affecting static and unchanging properties.  
 129. The seller in this setting plays the role of the scoundrel.  Rose, supra note 11, 
at 599–600. 
 130. Indeed, technological changes in the property might also be a proximate cause 
of the shift from crystal to mud rules.  For example, the evolution of the law of caveat 
emptor via decisional law may reflect the fact that the housing that is subject to the rule 
is different and distinct from the type and quality of housing that initially produced the 
rule.  That evolution in the law and its resultant impact on subsequent property 
transactions might then cause the law to continue to evolve so that a mud rule—created 
largely by the change in the nature of the premises—may eventually become a crystal 
rule through decisional authority as the law continually deals with the technological 
enhanced premises.  For example, take the sale of residential real estate.  Although we 
are currently in a cycle in which mud rules apply to the sale of real property, as opposed 
to the crystal rule embodied in the common law doctrine of caveat emptor, I predict that 
a crystal rule will emerge eventually.  I contend that sellers will adapt to the muddy rules 
by embracing norms that will result in the standardization of implied warranties—default 
rules—given by the seller to the buyer in the sale of the premises.  If that state is 
achieved, through norms or legislation, then a crystal rule may once again be imposed on 
the residential real estate transaction. 




Quite the contrary, as technology evolves and changes, ill-fitting rules 
must also evolve and change to address those changes. 
In other words just like the law is not static, neither is the object or 
subject of the rule being analyzed.  What works initially for a crystal rule 
may not work for something that is called the same thing but has 
technologically evolved far beyond its original form or design.  It should 
be self-evident that the caveat emptor doctrine worked as a default rule 
at common law due to the simplicity of the dwelling it was designed to 
regulate or govern.  As the dwelling became more complex, morphing 
into something that is nothing like the agrarian dwelling to which the 
original rule applied, the courts were unable to declare the old rule 
obsolete and develop a new rule given how common law rules evolve 
via court decisions instead of legislative fiat and declaration.  As the 
property evolved slowly and inexorably to its current form, the doctrine 
of caveat emptor also evolved to take into account the different 
characteristics of the property regulated. 
This evolution of the property being regulated represents a different 
challenge than, say, the creation of a new property right like the 
Internet.131  The development of a new form of property also creates the 
recognition and awareness that there is a void in the existing regulatory 
structure to govern the new entity.  Scholars and judges jump into the 
fray to fill the void created when the new property is created.  With 
respect to existing and evolving property, no void exists.  Instead judges 
and legislators must modify the crystal rules, making them mud, in order 
to regulate the newly evolved species of property.  The insight that is 
missing from Professor Rose’s theory regarding how mud rules become 
crystal is the lack of analysis and recognition of the evolution of the 
property that is being regulated by the rules.  That evolution of the 
property should also force an evolution in the norms, mores, et cetera, 
and in the rules governing the property rights. 
The second insight gained by an analysis of caveat emptor and its 
evolution into caveat emptor light is the fact that crystal rules are more 
likely to be used for what I designate “objective” determinations, and 
mud rules are more likely to be used for “subjective” determinations 
where multiple variants play into the equation concerning how resources 
or rights should be allocated.  Put another way, as determinations 
become more subjective with more variables being considered by the 
courts, the muddier the rules become.132  An analysis of the three fact 
 131. See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law 
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996). 
 132. Here I may be stating the obvious or restating what Professor Rose has 
characterized as the “overuse” of the doctrine in situations not particularly suitable for 
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situations described by Professor Rose in her article as prototypical 
crystal rules involves objective determinations.133  Thus the fact that the 
seller has no duty to disclose (caveat emptor); the mortgagor did not 
make the payment on law date (the equity of redemption); and the losing 
party was not the first to record (the operation of recording acts) entails a 
determination made by the trier of fact that is bipolar—yes or no—not 
maybe or partially, but definitive and dispositive.  Crystal rules, thus, 
work best when the fact to be decided is either up-down or yes-no with 
no subtle gradations to be made. 
Think of it this way: the common law sale of a house was a crystal 
transaction—objective and verifiable—something akin to a contingent 
one-shot transaction in which the parties were not repeat players.  In 
fact, many have alleged that the residential real estate transaction is the 
epitome of a contingent contract that should lead to the use of crystal 
rules.134  However, I contend that today’s transaction is more subjective 
and akin to a relational contract.  In order to determine the enforceability 
of the transaction, the court must determine what this seller knows and 
what is important to this buyer.  It is individualized and subjectivized to 
an extent that was not relevant at common law.  Hence, importantly, 
even though the parties in a real estate contract represent prototypical 
contingent contracting parties, the nature of the information sought is in 
fact relational.  Underlying the theory of relational versus contingent 
contracts is the notion that in contingent contracts the parties are dealing 
at arms length and each can take the maximum steps to protect their 
respective positions.  That is not true in the sale of the residence and has 
caused the further erosion of the doctrine of caveat emptor. 
Consequently, adding these two elements to Professor Rose’s theory 
makes its explanatory power more robust.  I would expect to see crystal 
rules become mud rules not only when: (1) crystal rules are extended to 
nonobvious situations; (2) when parties are in a relational contract; and 
(3) when courts are called to make an ex post adjudication that will 
involve the forfeiture of a significant asset; but also (4) in situations 
the extension of the doctrine.  See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.  However, I 
think it is important to note, if only as a descriptive matter, that when courts are called 
upon to look at fact situations that I have described as objective, they tend to adopt mud 
rather than crystal rules given the complexity of the fact situations and the variables 
involved. 
 133. Rose, supra note 11, at 580–90. 
 134. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
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where the variable being decided is subjectivized; and (5) the asset or 
variable about which the decision is made is itself evolving into a 
significantly different asset due to technological advances.  When all 
five of these variables are aligned, crystal rules will inevitably become 
mud rules and lead to the development of crystal rules to replace the 
muddied rules. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article represents an attempt to wed two seemingly disparate 
theories to explain why the common law doctrine of caveat emptor has 
evolved as it has over the last five centuries.  Taking first Dean 
Kronman’s theory of the efficient disclosure of information, I have 
addressed a puzzle that has remained unresolved: why did the caveat 
emptor doctrine develop when the seller clearly has knowledge about the 
premises that should be disclosed pursuant to those apparently accurate 
efficient disclosure theories?  By undertaking a historical analysis I have 
demonstrated why the common law rule of caveat emptor initially 
developed, why its erosion has been accomplished, and why it is 
currently reemerging pursuant to a doctrine I have designated as caveat 
emptor light. 
Concurrently I have taken Professor Rose’s elegant theory regarding 
the evolution of rules from crystal to mud and thence back to crystal and 
applied it to the caveat emptor doctrine.  In so doing, I demonstrate first 
that the caveat emptor doctrine represents the perfect doctrinal theory to 
prove her thesis.  Perhaps more importantly, I have also attempted to 
demonstrate that Professor Rose’s analysis is somewhat incomplete and 
must take into account the relationship of the parties and the evolving 
character of the resource being regulated in order to be complete.  An 
analysis of the caveat emptor doctrine and its evolution confirms that 
mud rules will be applied when objective situations become, over time, 
dependent on subjective determinations given the status of the parties.  
These subjective determinations are exacerbated by the technological 
evolution of the property being regulated.  Just as law evolves, so, too, 
does the property subject to its strictures.  As property evolves, so, too, 
must the law that governs and regulates its ownership and use. 
 
